Solyndra's Second Chapter

The details of the reorganization plan approved Monday by the judge hearing the Solyndra bankruptcy case reminded me of the admonition of one of my mentors always to beware of unintended consequences.  I'm sure the Department of Energy officials who recommended the federal loan guarantee for Solyndra in March of 2009 envisioned that the solar start-up would succeed.  As a worst-case outcome, they probably anticipated the loss of the entire $535 million direct federal loan ultimately provided by the Treasury. However, in a remarkable turn of events, the actual extent of the downside for taxpayers has now expanded to nearly $900 million, due to a quirk in the tax code and a subsequent DOE decision in 2011.

This odd sequence of events starts in early 2011 when two venture investors agreed to infuse another $75 million into the already failing Solyndra.  In order to facilitate this injection--presumably in hopes of protecting the government's substantial investment in the firm--the DOE agreed to allow the investors' loan to take precedence over the government's if Solyndra went bankrupt. Perhaps they thought that even in that case, they'd still recover most of the government's investment, because Solyndra had a sexy technology and a big new factory in Fremont, CA that could be sold to a competitor for close to full value.  They apparently didn't appreciate that Solyndra's high-cost technology had already been bypassed by falling polysilicon prices, and that the factory and its custom equipment wouldn't be of much interest to other solar producers, who were in the process of creating a huge global overhang of solar manufacturing capacity.  The Solyndra plant will now apparently be sold to a hard-drive maker for just $90 million.

In the meantime, Solyndra was piling up substantial losses running its plant and selling solar modules below cost, in order to compete with conventional solar panels that had become much cheaper. By the time Solyndra entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, its cumulative losses apparently totaled $975 million.  To put that in perspective, the combined after tax profits of First Solar, the largest US solar producer, for the three years in which the DOE's loan to Solyndra was outstanding, were $1,265 million.

What makes Solyndra's losses relevant is that, contrary to intuition, they didn't disappear in bankruptcy.  Instead, via the investors' plan for emerging from bankruptcy, they became an asset.  And because the DOE ceded the first place in line to private investors, it is those investors who will control those "net operating losses" retained by Solyndra's reorganized parent company, 360 Degree Solar Holdings, Inc. That company apparently kept none of Solyndra's hardware, but when it acquires other companies--in any line of business--it will be able to offset future federal tax liabilities estimated by Bloomberg at $341 million.  Meanwhile, the federal government is likely to recover just 5 cents on the dollar on its "secured loan."  The Solyndra loan is a gift that keeps on giving. 

Hindsight is 20/20, but it seems pretty clear that the folks at DOE were outsmarted by private investors who had a much clearer picture of the stakes for which they were negotiating.  As we were reminded last week, Solyndra wasn't the only investment they made that went bad.  Let's hope that the others don't include similarly unpleasant surprises.  Meanwhile, I wish the IRS and Alameda County the best of luck in appealing the bankruptcy judge's ruling.

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More Lessons from Solyndra

I'll bet that those working and investing in renewable energy are even more tired of the steady stream of headlines from the unraveling Solyndra mess than the rest of us are. Today's crop includes more evidence of the political linkages to the overall process for determining the company's suitability for federal backing and the revelation that an investor in Solyndra was advising the US Navy to sign a contract with them, even as the firm was on the verge of collapse. None of this has done either the industry or the administration any good, and there is much to be learned from this episode. That includes lessons concerning direct government support for the full-scale deployment of renewable energy and other technologies.

Start with the ethics issues. No one should be surprised that investors in Solyndra were lobbying the DOE and White House in support of the company's application for a federal loan guarantee. That was hardly unique to Solyndra or renewable energy. And I'm perfectly willing to accept, unless proven otherwise, that both the DOE advisor whose wife works for a law firm representing Solyndra, and the venture capitalist who apparently advised the Navy to buy Solyndra's technology in his capacity with the Pentagon's Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative, thought they had done everything necessary to resolve any potential conflicts of interest in this matter. Yet in both cases it seems clear that even if nothing improper was done, the appearance of impropriety is very hard to dispel after what seemed like a routine transaction turns into a front-page scandal.

Whenever I see this sort of thing I can't help recalling the early training I received as a petroleum products trader for Texaco, which took anti-trust compliance very seriously. The lawyer who advised our Supply & Distribution department on such matters always reminded us to think about how our dealings with other companies might look if we had to explain them from the witness stand in a court of law. He invariably advised going beyond mere compliance; his mantra was, "Avoid the appearance of evil." That's a lesson that it seems many of the officials involved in the Solyndra debacle either forgot or never received, even if they believed they were in full compliance with existing ethics policies.

When you step back from such details it becomes apparent that these are precisely the sorts of conflicts that result, when the government involves itself so deeply in transactions of a magnitude that would normally be handled in the commercial sector--which even when it makes mistakes does so with shareholder dollars, rather than tax dollars. And make no mistake, if Solyndra had gone broke after receiving $500,000 from Uncle Sam, rather than $535 million, none of these other issues would matter or have seen the light of day.

It's perfectly appropriate--even necessary--for the government to make modest-sized bets on new technology in key areas, particularly when they require greater patience than most corporations are capable of. And it's to be expected that many or even most such bets will turn out to be dead ends, as Solyndra did. The problem is that while a few million dollars will buy a lot of renewable energy R&D, they will buy only a negligible amount of deployment. While the government can afford to make numerous small bets that don't turn out well but advance our knowledge in the process, it can only afford to make a small number of bets on the scale of the Solyndra loan. That ought to be especially true when the deficit and debt loom as large as they do, unless you're a firm believer in the "broken windows" theory of stimulus, or Lord Keynes's suggestion that the government could productively bury bottles of money and let people dig them up.

The easy question is whether the Department of Energy should have backed Solyndra. I have concluded the answer is no, and not just based on after-the-fact information. The much harder question is whether the US government should be in the business of providing this level of support for large-scale manufacturing or deployment, rather than just R&D. And even if it should, can it develop the necessary expertise and processes, not only to make such decisions at least as well as its commercial counterparts would, but also to insulate the decision-makers from the political influence that such high stakes are bound to attract. Answering that depends on a lot more than just one's political or economic philosophy.

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Drawing Conclusions from Solyndra

When the energy portions of the 2009 stimulus were announced I remarked to a colleague that I wouldn't be surprised if its billions in incentives led to a future scandal or two. In fact, I was thinking more along the lines of fraudulent diversions from the Treasury's renewable energy grant program, which has handed out $8.7 billion since its inception. That program had its own day in the spotlight when it turned out that a significant portion of the initial disbursements were going either to non-US companies or to pay for equipment made outside the US, undermining its green jobs rationale. However, I wouldn't have guessed that the biggest scandal would erupt from the ostensibly lower-risk loan guarantee program of the Department of Energy. The prospect that a tussle over a small cut to that program, for which eligibility is due to end in a few days, nearly set up another government shutdown crisis seems even stranger.

Whatever happens to the loan guarantee program, the decision to lend over $500 million to Solyndra looks bad, and not just in retrospect, with the firm in bankruptcy. The market environment that Solyndra was betting on was already shifting in late 2008--months before its loan was approved. The global bottleneck in the supply of polysilicon, the key raw material for the crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules with which Solyndra's unique CIGS modules competed, was easing as new polysilicon capacity was coming on line, more was under construction, and polysilicon prices were falling. Someone at the DOE should accept responsibility--and the consequences--for ignoring or missing that signal and concluding that it was a good time for Solyndra to double its capacity and fixed costs.

As tempting as it might be to dwell on Solyndra's failure, that should not be our primary concern right now. If laws are found to have been broken or influence improperly used, there will be ample time to address that. Nor should we dwell on the fate of the other projects for which $10 billion in loans or loan guarantees have already been concluded. Many of those projects involve generating renewable power and selling it under long-term agreements that will ensure a profit, with little additional risk. Instead, oversight should focus urgently on those projects that are still under consideration or have received only conditional approvals to date.

One of the applications that apparently got caught in the fallout from Solyndra was a project of Solar City Corp. to install up to 371 MW of rooftop solar panels at military facilities across the US. Solar City was seeking a partial (presumably 80%) guarantee of up to $344 million in loans to carry out these projects. This is precisely the sort of initiative necessary to deliver on the military's goals to increase its use of renewable energy. I heard a lot more about that at an Air Force energy briefing at the Pentagon earlier this month and will write about that session when I receive the responses to the follow-up questions I sent in.

The military faces two major obstacles in achieving its energy objectives, and projects like Solar City's would help overcome both. First, energy generation assets are expensive and would compete with military hardware procurement and other budget priorities. Having someone else make those investments and charge the services for power that they'd otherwise have to buy from a utility is as useful for the military as it is for homeowners who can't afford the up-front costs of rooftop solar. The other aspect with which the project helps is that the economics of rooftop solar still depend on federal and state incentives that the Department of Defense can't access directly. In this case, Solar City would buy and install the hardware and collects the tax credits and other incentives that allow them to charge the military a competitive price for power. With time running out on its application, the company has apparently decided to pursue a scaled-down version of the project with only commercial financing.

As for any remaining applications, if the DOE can't convince itself that they are sound before the clock runs out at the end of the month, then it must either turn them down or ask the Congress for more time. Whatever call the DOE makes it had better be prepared for the scrutiny and second-guessing they are bound to receive. The Solyndra debacle has arguably done as much harm to US renewable energy policy as the Enron scandal did to energy trading. Another Solyndra might just put an end to the whole proposition of financing green energy with public funds in the US.

Note: Posting updated to reflect the current status of Solar City's project.

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Gasoline Could Cost Consumers an Extra $150 Billion in 2011

A poll reported in this morning's Wall St. Journal (subscription) indicated that more Americans are significantly affected by high gas prices than by rising food prices, falling home values, unemployment or foreclosures. That's a surprising result, considering that transportation fuel only accounts for about 5% of average household expenses. However, gasoline has one of the most visible prices in our society, and the scale of our fuel use is such that price increases of the recent magnitude aggregate to a very large total. Based on year-to-date prices and compared to a more typical year like 2006, the drag on the US economy is running between $100 and $150 billion for 2011, reversing any "gasoline stimulus" we received in 2009.

As of the latest price report from the Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency, the national average price for unleaded regular gasoline has dropped back to $3.71 per gallon from its May peak of just under $4. Despite that, it's still more than a buck higher than this time last year. In fact, until a couple of weeks ago gas prices were trending well above their path in 2008, when prices reached an all-time high of $4.11/gal. that July. (See above chart.) When I compared this year's prices to those in 2006, which averaged only about 20 cents per gallon lower than last year's but exhibited more normal seasonality, and then multiplied by the more than 137 billion gallons of gasoline the US is likely to consume this year, the total drag on the economy worked out to between $100 and $150 billion on a full-year basis. (See chart below.) If these prices persisted, that would be enough to negate the effect of the entire 2% cut in Social Security taxes for 2011.

Fortunately, barring an escalation of the current supply disruptions in the Middle East, a major hurricane affecting Gulf Coast refinery operations, or an unexpected surge in economic growth, we've probably either already seen the peak gasoline price for the year or are within a few weeks of it. The outcome of last week's OPEC meeting, while not as bearish for prices as an agreement to increase quotas and output would have been, has had little lasting effect on oil prices, which are running at a level consistent with this week's US average pump price or a bit less. However, no one should confuse a seasonal easing in prices with a permanent return to cheaper gas. Short of another global economic crisis, global oil supply and demand remain closely enough matched that any hiccup will quickly translate into higher prices at the pump. I feel safe in predicting that we'll be flirting with $4 again before long, and the consequences of that should be factored into any forecasts of future economic growth.

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Renewable Energy: Horses for Courses

It has become nearly impossible to keep track of all the major wind and solar projects underway at any point in time. Considering that I can recall when a month's worth of project announcements could be counted on the fingers of one hand, that's a sign of the tremendous progress in renewable energy over the last decade. Today, the projects that I notice tend to involve either novel technologies, or companies or locations in which I'm interested, such as the new rooftop solar thermal installation on the convention center of St. Paul, Minnesota, not far from where my in-laws live. I probably wouldn't have even paid attention to this one, if the eye-popping price tag hadn't included a cool million in federal stimulus funding. As I read on, it quickly became clear from the figures included in the news story that it requires more imagination than I possess to view this project as a good investment for taxpayers.

In putting the project's $2 million cost into perspective it's important to understand the distinction between solar thermal collectors and solar photovoltaic panels (PV). The former capture and transfer heat, while the latter turn sunlight into electricity, which is much more valuable. A 1 Megawatt (MW) PV installation would cost quite a lot more than $2 million, but that doesn't make this installation's price a bargain. Assessing that depends on the annual energy savings and resulting avoided fuel purchases. From the project description and the emissions reductions cited in the article it was possible to work out the expected annual energy savings involved, which appeared to have been something of a mystery to the facility spokesperson quoted. A MW of solar thermal equates to 3.4 million BTUs per hour, although the River Centre's rooftop clearly wouldn't generate that on a 24/7 basis even in a much sunnier location than the Twin Cities. However, the 900,000 pounds a year of avoided CO2 are unambiguous. At 117 lb. CO2 per million BTUs of pipeline gas, that equates to saving 7.7 billion BTUs of gas a year. And at last year's average commercial natural gas price for the state, that works out to an annual avoided cost of $58,000.

When I convert that stream of future energy savings into its net present value over 25 years, even with fairly generous assumptions on the cost of capital and future natural gas inflation, it is worth about what the convention center alone paid for it, or around $1 million, ignoring the impact of the two years it apparently took to build it. So in the parlance of corporate project evaluation, the federal officials who approved the RiverCentre's solar roof for that stimulus grant destroyed about a million dollars of taxpayer value when they decided to fund a solar thermal project in such a northern location with relatively low annual peak-sun hours. What were they thinking?

Well, the DOE official present at the facility's unveiling offered a clue by means of a hockey quote--always a good call in Minnesota. "We want to be where the puck is going to be, not where it is now." I would translate that as their funding of this project constituting an investment in bringing down the cost of future solar installations. Unfortunately, that would be much more credible if the installation in question involved leading-edge thin film or multi-junction concentrating PV technology, for which performance and cost have been improving steadily, if not quite in Moore's Law fashion. But this is solar hot water. The thermodynamics and heat-transfer considerations for such an application haven't changed since I was in engineering school, even if the packaging has improved. There's only so much heat to be captured and transferred, especially in a place with an average January temperature of 22°F.

When I'm critical of projects such as this one, it's not out of a sense that all renewable energy is impractical or ineffective. Renewables are earning a place in our energy mix, and they will become even more important in the years ahead. However, because they depend on harnessing diffuse energy sources in real time, rather than disgorging geologically stored energy in the manner of fossil fuels, it matters greatly where we put them. That's why I've been relentless in my criticism of Germany's overly-generous feed-in tariffs, and I see rooftop solar thermal in St. Paul in much the same light. Installing renewable energy devices in locations with poor resources, particularly using taxpayer money--or in this case money borrowed on the taxpayers' behalf--reinforces all the worst stereotypes about renewable energy as a boondoggle. The British have an expression that seems apt here, "horses for courses": run the right horse for each racecourse. If someone wants to bet their own money on rooftop solar in Minnesota, they do so with my blessing. But where my tax money is involved--and perhaps I'm especially sensitive about that this time of the year--I insist that it be done someplace that affords the technology a decent chance of earning an economic return, rather than just feel-good, PR value.

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A Wind Bubble?

New US wind turbine installations have slowed significantly this year, compared to 2009, and the decline is having consequences. Among other fallout, Suzlon is mothballing a four-year-old wind turbine factory in Minnesota and laying off the remaining 110 workers, due to a lack of new orders. While the industry pins most of the blame for the slowdown on insufficiently aggressive federal energy policies, it suddenly occurred to me to wonder whether wind power, like housing, might have been caught up in an investment bubble that has finally popped, somewhat belatedly.

The idea of a wind bubble goes against all conventional wisdom, including the importance of expanding electricity generation from low-emission sources in order to mitigate climate change; the desire to build a vibrant "new energy" economy in the US for energy security and competitive reasons; and the persistent mantra of the green jobs that are supposed to turn the economy around. Yet every bubble must have a compelling, plausible narrative, or it would never take off.

When you examine the charts of annual and quarterly US wind turbine installations on pages 2 and 3 of the "Third Quarter 2010 Market Report" from the American Wind Energy Association, there are at least two ways to look at them. The customary perspective would attribute the dramatic increase in wind installations beginning in 2006, which set records in each of the next three years, to the rapid scaling up of an industry that many envision supplying 20% of US electricity generation within two decades, up from its current level of around 2%. This growth has been supported by a variety of incentives and mandates, including the federal renewable production tax credit (PTC), the stimulus grants, and state renewable portfolio standards. But in this scenario it's hard to explain why installations would have fallen off so much this year, when all of these benefits are still in place, other than the imminent expiration of eligibility for the stimulus grants--which in another year might have been expected to trigger a mad rush for projects to get in under the wire, as we saw in 2008 when the PTC was due to expire at year end. How can we attribute this year's drop in installations to the absence of a policy--either a national renewable electricity standard or a comprehensive climate bill--that we've never had?

So turn this picture around and ask why wind might have been in a bubble, and why that bubble might have only popped now, roughly two years after the other bubbles for stocks, housing and possibly oil prices. Aside from the policies promoting wind and other renewables, which have not changed, wind power developers would have looked at two other indicators: credit and demand. Wind projects are capital intensive, and in the run-up to the financial crisis they benefited from the same kind of cheap and readily available credit as other businesses and homeowners did. At the same time, between 2000 and 2007 US demand for electricity was growing at about 1.3% per year. That might not seem like much, but at the scale of the US power sector, that translated into the need to add around 7,000 MW of new generating capacity each year. If all of that was from wind turbines, the required nameplate capacity would approach 20,000 MW, because of wind's lower average output per MW. Wind was also becoming a preferred technology, despite its intermittency, because coal was falling out of favor for environmental reasons and the price of natural gas, the fuel for the dominant incremental generation technology for the last 20 years, had spiked and become very volatile.

If wind was indeed being carried along either by its own bubble or by the froth from the other bubbles fueling the economy in the middle of the decade, why has it only now run out of steam, rather than popping in 2008 or 2009? After all, electricity demand growth evaporated when the financial crisis and recession hit, and demand has not yet recovered to its 2007 peak. For 2008, perhaps the dash to complete projects before the expected expiration of the PTC--it wasn't extended until October of that year--provides sufficient explanation. As for 2009, the charts show that installations did fall dramatically until the implementation of the Treasury stimulus grant program, which injected $1.7 B into wind projects last year and another $2.9 B this year. Moreover, the stimulus grants were more valuable to wind developers than the PTC they formerly received. That isn't just because developers got the money up front, rather than having to wait until a project started up and produced electricity, but also because the grants were based on the 30% investment tax credit (ITC). Using NREL's simplified calculator for the levelized cost of electricity, at a typical cost of around $2,200/kW of capacity the ITC could be worth at least 20% more than the 2.2¢/kWh PTC. In other words, just as the wind market was collapsing last year, the government increased its incentives and accelerated them into up-front cash. That might have been enough to keep a bubble going for a while longer.

Of course there's no way to know whether this scenario is more accurate than the standard explanation for what has happened to the US wind market this year. Nor does it doom wind power to the doldrums even after the economy resumes growing and creating jobs at a healthier rate, and electricity demand picks up. However, if there is a grain of truth in this view, then it might alter our perspective on providing more aggressive support for the wind industry based on the notion that installations should still be running at 10,000 MW per year or more, as they were in 2009, rather than at the lower rate of around 5,000 MW we see today.

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Interpreting the Election Results

The results of yesterday's election will be interpreted and spun in many ways in the days and weeks ahead. Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives and several key governorships but fell short of capturing control of the Senate. In the process they picked up enough seats--along with at least one like-minded Democratic Senator-elect--to put cap & trade or a national carbon tax out of reach for at least the next two years. Meanwhile, voters resoundingly defeated a ballot initiative in California that would have forestalled implementation of the state's tough greenhouse gas policies. But even if comprehensive federal energy legislation is off the table, divided government doesn't rule out the possibility of a national renewable energy standard or other energy measures, provided they don't involve significant additional expenditures.

On the surface, the election outcome appears to set up a return to the pre-2009 situation, when California and other states were pushing aggressively for action on climate change while the federal government remained deadlocked on the issue. Too much has changed since then for that picture to be accurate. In the absence of Congressional action on greenhouse gas emissions the EPA is forging ahead with its own regulations under the Clean Air Act, and that could provide an early test of the willingness of the new Congress to try to modify the administration's regulatory approach. Meanwhile, although the proposition that would have suspended California's A.B. 32 climate rules was swamped after being portrayed--unfairly, in my view--as mainly benefiting out-of-state oil companies at the expense of the state's new Cleantech industry, California voters passed another initiative, Proposition 26, that will make it harder to impose a variety of new fees on businesses and consumers, including fees related to the environment. Further complicating the outlook, the results of several key governor's races, including in New Mexico and possibly Oregon, could limit the number of other states that might "opt in" to A.B. 32, as well as raising the possibility of more defections from the Western Climate Initiative.

Although as I noted on Monday our fundamental energy situation is largely pre-determined for at least the next few years, last night's results could affect energy policy in a number of other ways, aside from climate change. One example is the President's desire to eliminate subsidies for conventional energy, as part of an initiative of the G-20 group of nations. The main subsidies targeted by this international effort are those that increase demand by limiting the price of fossil fuels for consumers, particularly in developing countries, yet President Obama has linked this to his goal of eliminating a variety of tax breaks benefiting domestic energy production, including the Section 199 tax deduction that all US manufacturers enjoy. Unless this measure is somehow passed in the lame duck session when Congress returns from its election break, it looks dead on arrival come January. From an energy security perspective we should be glad of that.

The change in control of the House also puts the extension of the expiring ethanol blending credit in doubt, along with the prospect of extending eligibility for Treasury renewable energy stimulus grants beyond the end of this year. Even though the latter appears deficit-neutral, and might thus attract bi-partisan support, it accelerates benefits that project developers would otherwise have to wait until their next tax filing to receive, and it probably lets some marginal projects that might not otherwise find private funding escape winnowing. If the lame duck doesn't pass this, the odds of the 112th Congress extending it or anything else connected to the stimulus look poor.

Ultimately the likelihood of meaningful energy legislation of any kind will hinge on the willingness of the President and the new Congress to meet somewhere in the middle to get things done. Otherwise, the scope is limited to a few lowest-common-denominator efforts, which might include a modest national renewable electricity standard, with everything else effectively blocked by the other chamber of Congress or the President's veto pen. I don't expect to lack for topics on which to blog in the next two years.

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Post-Stimulus Transition for Renewable Energy

One of the largest uncertainties affecting the US renewable energy sector is how it will make the transition from the special subsidies provided under last year's stimulus bill (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) back to the "normal" incentives available prior to the financial crisis and recession. The key element of this concerns the Treasury renewable energy grant program, which has stood in for the "tax equity" market that stalled around the time Lehman Brothers went under. Eligibility for the grants expires at the end of this year, and companies that have benefited from them are calling for an extension into 2011 or beyond. That looks like a long-shot at this point. However, another proposal not specifically aimed at renewable energy could provide exactly the sort of transition support the industry requires, while also beginning the necessary task of treating this sector more like others.

As of the Treasury Department's most recent update, renewable energy projects have received a total of $5.2 billion under the "1603" grant program, with more than 85% going to large-scale wind farms. Solar electric and thermal projects received $330 million, or about 6%, trailed by geothermal, biomass power, and small-scale wind. With the financial markets that developers had previously relied on to exchange future tax credits for current cash in disarray last year, the 1603 grants were a crucial stop-gap. However, with electricity demand still lagging and renewables facing strong competition from cheap natural gas, the US wind industry has gone into a slump that might deepen further, once developers' new projects are no longer eligible for up-front cash grants, forcing them to wait for tax credits that accrue as power is generated.

Several proposals to extend the 1603 grants are floating around the Congress, including one from Senator Cantwell (D-WA), but the mid-term elections are looming and the mood in the country is turning away from direct economic stimulus, so an extension is far from a sure thing. Nor does the argument that the grants are deficit-neutral, because they merely accelerate payments, entirely wash. Once the incentive for wind power reverts to the Production Tax Credit (PTC) or substitute Investment Tax Credit (ITC) on 1/1/11, companies would again need substantial taxable earnings to claim it, and not all would qualify. That's one of the main reasons that cash up front was such a powerful incentive for developers. It's also never been clear how the tax equity market was expected to revive fully as long as firms could get cash from the Treasury instead, without any transaction fees beyond filling out the paperwork. Whatever we do about the expiring stimulus grants, we need to get this market on a trajectory back to normal.

The best solution for bridging this transition might involve a measure that doesn't seem to have been aimed at the renewable energy sector at all. Last week President Obama proposed allowing businesses to expense 100% of capital investments in 2011. This would kick in just as eligibility for the 1603 grants ends, and at the 35% tax rate that most corporations are subject to, it could actually be worth more than the 30% renewable energy ITC upon which the grants were based. That would help compensate for the difference between receiving these funds up front and waiting to file a tax return. The new benefit would also be calculated on the amount invested, like the grants, rather than the quantity of power produced, as under the PTC.

There's an additional advantage to this approach, which would put the decision for capital investment and allocation entirely back in the hands of corporate managers and boards--who are accountable for their results--rather than government bureaucrats with little experience at running a business or gauging which projects make sense and which don't. And if it means that companies that can't wait until they file taxes to collect the benefit must convince a banker or other investor of the merits of the project, that's an extra layer of market discipline that might winnow out some projects now, but would help ensure that those that survive are more viable.

In the long run, renewable energy must stand on its own feet, without incentives that are orders of magnitude larger, per unit of energy produced, than those for conventional energy. Most renewable electricity technologies aren't ready to make that leap, but forcing them to rely on the same 100% investment expensing that other businesses would be given next year (if enacted into law) looks like a good first step, instead of extending a stimulus program that must end sooner or later.

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Where's the Peak?

I've been going through the International Energy Agency's new forecast for medium-term oil and natural gas markets, issued yesterday. In contrast to the IEA's warnings of last summer concerning an imminent oil supply crunch, the agency now sees ample supplies to accommodate the level of demand growth it anticipates for the next five years. Yet while this scenario does not envision a peak in global oil supplies before 2015, its components offer ample cause for concern about the growing market power of OPEC and the risk of geopolitical disruptions. It also signals the growing importance of non-traditional sources of liquid fuels, including natural gas liquids (NGLs) and biofuels, which are included in the IEA's oil supply & demand balance.

The headline features of the IEA's oil forecast include continued growth in global oil capacity from 91 million barrels per day (MBD) in 2009 to 96.5 MBD in 2015. This is driven by the growth of OPEC's capacity, the NGL output of a global natural gas expansion that the US shale gas boom has accelerated, and increased production of ethanol and other biofuels. IEA sees this combination as more than sufficient to counteract a roughly 3.5% annual decline in the output of existing oil fields, including a peak and net decline in non-OPEC production within the next year or two. The latter won't surprise anyone who's been following the Peak Oil issue, but it's all the more worrying when you consider that it doesn't include the impact of project delays owing to the on-again, off-again US deepwater drilling moratorium, which the administration seems determined to switch back on.

This picture is fraught with risks and vulnerabilities, including the prominent role of Iraqi oil revitalization projects, which appear to account for half of the growth in OPEC crude oil capacity in the period. Although there's ample scope to stimulate more output from Iraq's mature fields, and the potential of its undeveloped fields represents the largest conventional oil opportunity in the world, none of it will come to fruition if the county doesn't remain quasi-stable. This might be one area in which the reassignment of General Petraeus to Afghanistan from his CentCom post, where he retained oversight of the Iraq security situation, might not look so positive.

Then there's that shift toward NGLs and biofuels, including the IEA's somewhat surprising prediction that while biofuels will continue to grow globally, the rate of growth will slow, with US output reaching a plateau long before it has attained the targets of the Renewable Fuels Standard. They also appear to be even more skeptical than I am that cellulosic ethanol is on the verge of scaling up rapidly. The larger problem is that both of these sources constitute what I would call "hamburger helper" for oil. Neither ethanol nor first-generation biodiesel (FAME) constitutes an effective gallon-for-gallon substitute for petroleum products, except in blends limited by both infrastructure and legacy vehicle fleets not equipped to handle more than small percentages of these fuels. NGLs provide propane and butane essentially indistinguishable from crude-sourced LPG and just as useful for petrochemicals and heating fuel, but they yield much less in the way of gasoline components, and the ones they do require significant processing to boost their octane, now that tetra-ethyl lead is out of the picture.

On the demand side, things look pretty much as we'd expect in the aftermath of a global recession that hit the developed world harder than the big developing countries--BICs, if not BRICs. As was true before the financial crisis, however, the Middle East contributes the second-biggest source of new demand, after Asia. That means continued growth in domestic demand within some of today's largest oil exporters. Even if that doesn't lead to "peak exports", it buttresses the fundamental shift in global market power underpinning a forecast that might otherwise appear calming to markets.

Anyone looking to the IEA for signs of an imminent peak in global oil supplies won't find it in their Medium Term Oil and Gas Markets 2010 report. What I see instead is a continuation of the world we are already in, with OPEC holding the trump cards. Traders tend to focus on the weekly fluctuations of oil market inventories and indications that supply or demand may grow or shrink in the months and years ahead. Yet while the release of this report, together with another build in US crude inventories this week, reportedly contributed to the $2/bbl drop in oil prices in the last two days, these reactions seem oblivious to a larger reality. With more than 5 million barrels per day of OPEC production capacity shut in, the main reason that oil is trading in the mid-to-high $70s, rather than the mid-to-high $40s, is that OPEC is functioning as a truly effective cartel that is much happier with higher prices. Politicians looking for another economic stimulus might consider the anti-stimulus that oil prices are currently providing, and the consequences of policies that could hand even more power to OPEC in the short-to-midterm.

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Renewable Energy and Domestic Content

The current scuffle between the US Congress and the wind industry began last fall with reports of a large wind farm in Texas involving both Chinese investors and Chinese wind turbines. It ratcheted up last week, with four key Senators proposing to close the "loophole" that enables renewable energy projects built with imported hardware to receive stimulus funds. The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) promptly retorted that the problem wasn't the wind projects and their suppliers, but a lack of consistent renewable energy policies coming out of the Congress. The more I've thought about this situation, the more I am convinced that both parties to this tiff are missing the bigger picture.

Let's start with the response by AWEA, which used the occasion to reiterate their consistent support for a national renewable electricity standard they contend would provide a clear policy signal for anyone contemplating investing in the facilities and workforce needed to manufacture wind turbines, solar arrays and other renewable energy gear here in the US. That sounds good, but it's equally clear from the record rate of wind installations last year that demand wasn't the problem, nor was it lack of government incentives to stimulate that demand. The Production Tax Credit for wind power has already been extended through 2012 and seems unlikely to be allowed to expire again, and the Investment Tax Credit for solar was extended through 2016. For that matter, 29 states plus the District of Columbia already have Renewable Portfolio Standards of the type AWEA is advocating for the country as a whole, and many of the states without one lack good wind resources in any case. The main aspect that has been in contention is whether the option to convert these tax credits to up-front cash grants--the benefit at the heart of the controversy over foreign-sourced wind turbines--should be extended beyond the end of this year. On the whole, then, the uncertainties faced by wind manufacturers don't look any worse than those confronting other manufacturers, and they might not even be as bad.

Next consider the complaint of the four Senators that such renewable energy grants ought to be reserved for projects that create green jobs here in the US, rather than overseas. This concern was prompted by a study suggesting that the lion's share of such grants to date has gone to non-US firms. While that negates most of the Keynesian stimulus benefits of the policy, it's also a nearly-inevitable result of the way that global manufacturing is now structured. Expecting all wind turbines funded by stimulus grants to be stamped "Made in USA" is no more realistic than expecting every car, computer, and paperclip paid for by stimulus money to have been made by American workers in an American factory. For good or ill, we don't live in that world anymore, and that's one reason that the entire federal stimulus has been less effective than hoped in promoting domestic employment: a large fraction of what we consume is either made elsewhere or includes many non-US components. Although wind turbine manufacturing started as a small, localized undertaking in the US and a few European countries, it has grown with extraordinary speed during precisely the same period that the supply chains of numerous industries became thoroughly globalized.

While these trends of manufacturing globalization and blanket support for renewable energy set the stage for it, the current collision over domestic content in the wind industry is the direct consequence of the pervasive green jobs theme that both politicians and advocacy groups like AWEA adopted for similar reasons of expediency last year: how else do you justify spending billions in tax dollars on this sort of thing during a recession, if it doesn't stimulate the US economy and create lots of jobs?

The solution to this conundrum is tricky. Since it's unlikely that either side can now admit that green jobs have been oversold as a justification for renewable energy policies, both sides ought to focus their efforts on manufacturing, and by that I don't mean just throwing up a few final-assembly plants where imported turbine parts can be bolted together, but rather addressing the factors that have affected US competitiveness across a wide range of industries. That includes high corporate tax rates, weak tax incentives for manufacturing investment, and the stifling overlap in federal, state and local regulations. More urgently, it should be clear that the solution does not involve erecting trade barriers in the form of domestic-content rules that would provoke retaliatory measures that would harm successful US export sectors. Nor does it include obscuring the magnitude of renewable energy subsidies by moving them out of the federal budget--where they are at least visible--and into the cost base of utilities by converting them into renewable energy mandates. While it might be appropriate to shift the burden from taxpayers to ratepayers, the industry needs smart incentives, not a perpetual subsidy along the lines of corn ethanol (three decades and counting.)

I used to think that all of these arcane and inefficient incentives could be swept aside by putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions, via either cap & trade or a carbon tax. I'm now skeptical about that, because of the way that Congress has insisted on combining cap & trade with a renewable electricity standard plus direct, technology-specific subsidies in the Waxman-Markey bill and its siblings. The spectacle of the US Treasury writing checks for hundreds of millions of dollars to Spanish and Chinese wind turbine companies is the inevitable result of this kind of convoluted thinking.

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Oil Prices and the Recovery

As oil prices continue their upward trend, I'm noticing more articles and getting more comments from readers questioning whether $80-plus oil could squelch the nascent economic recovery--or for those who believe the recession isn't over, deepen it again. It's not an unreasonable question, particularly when we compare current retail fuel prices to their level of a year ago: the "gasoline stimulus" that I was tracking for much of last year. A quick glance at the chart below reveals that instead of paying a dollar or more per gallon less than twelve months earlier, as we were for much of 2009, the average US retail price for unleaded regular is now roughly a buck higher than it was the same time last year. That can't be favorable news for consumers or for businesses depending on a resurgence in consumer demand for other goods and services. But is it enough to stall economic growth?


Although I still check oil prices on a regular basis--at least every couple of days, instead of every few minutes when I was trading the stuff--sometimes I notice price trends the same way most of my readers do: by driving by neighborhood gas stations and watching the most visible price in America change day to day. The recent steady, counter-seasonal rise against the backdrop of generally slack demand and comfortably high inventories, and in the absence of any significant global supply disruptions has had me a bit perplexed. And it's really all down to oil prices, since refining margins remain fairly weak and are only as strong as they are as a result of several refineries being shut down entirely and most others running at historically low rates of throughput.

Nor does this seem to be an instance of what I've called the oil-dollar price loop. Since December 11, 2009 crude prices are up by 18%, despite the US dollar strengthening by 3% against the Euro and 5% against the Japanese Yen over the same interval, amid a general surge of commodity prices.

Most analysts seem to attribute higher oil and commodity prices to higher demand from countries like China, as the global economy responds to the impact of various stimulus packages and the stabilization of the banking system. China's growth has been particularly impressive, but even if this is boosting its demand for oil imports by 25%, as one source suggested, that hardly seems likely to swamp the substantial spare capacity that OPEC has accumulated in the last year and a half. As I noted last week, OPEC has successfully held over 3 million barrels per day off the market and maintained global oil prices at a level that wouldn't be possible based only on renewed economic growth in China and its anticipation by the market elsewhere. OPEC has attracted remarkably little flak for this policy, which a year ago probably prevented oil prices from going into free fall. That would have harmed all producers, and eventually consumers, too, by drying up future supplies.

So what's the financial impact of OPEC's self-restraint on US consumers and our economy? Even if you ignore the year-earlier comparison, current retail gas prices are around 30 cents per gallon above their average for last year. For a household driving 25,000 miles per year in typical cars, that's worth at least $25 per month. Across the entire 138 billion gallon-per-year gasoline market, that aggregates to around $40 billion/year. Applying the underlying $13/bbl oil price rise since mid-December to our net oil imports of roughly 10 million bbl/day, that figure increases to just under $50 billion/year.

As unwelcome as this additional drag on the recovery might be, at current levels it seems unlikely to further derail our $14 trillion economy, even if it contributes several billion dollars a month to our trade deficit and, along with high unemployment, depresses consumer confidence. However, near-$3 gas is one thing; widespread expectations of a return to $4 per gallon would be quite another. While higher oil prices mainly due to OPEC restraint aren't yet a cause for panic, this trend certainly bears watching.

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Green Power or Green Jobs

Until now I've avoided the debate over a proposed wind project in Texas involving Chinese investors, federal renewable energy stimulus grants and wind turbines from China, mainly because I didn't think I had anything salient to add to the unpleasant mix of protectionism and second-guessing that was unfolding. This morning I read a posting on the subject from the Breakthrough Institute that, while offering a coherent explanation of how we got to this point, convinced me that the real problem still hasn't been addressed. Although the inconsistency of past and present US energy policy is readily apparent, the current concerns arise from general confusion over the benefits of renewable energy, exacerbated by the recent effort to spin these projects and technologies in terms of "green jobs." When we don't really understand why we are doing something, it's easy to make any outcome look like a failure--and there is no shortage of elements from which to craft such a view in the situation at hand.

The chief complaint about the project in question is that it might be eligible to take advantage of a key energy provision of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009--this year's stimulus bill--that allows the developers of a qualifying renewable energy project to collect an up-front cash grant from the US Treasury equal to 30% of the cost of the project. In this case much of that money, along with the funds provided by the US and Chinese partners, would go to pay for wind turbines imported from China. As a result, most of the jobs this project would create would be in China, not the US. On the face of it, this looks like a colossal loophole that some high-profile legislators--who incidentally voted for the stimulus bill including this feature--are rushing to plug. However, this only looks like a nasty unintended consequence of a hastily-crafted law if you misunderstand the mechanics and purpose of the Treasury renewable energy grant program.

You have to begin with the renewable energy tax credits that were in place prior to the passage of the stimulus bill. Qualifying wind projects normally received a federal tax credit of 2 cents per kWh generated for ten years after start-up, adjusted for inflation. Along with similar tax benefits for solar and geothermal power and other renewable energy technologies, the wind Production Tax Credit (PTC) was due to expire at the end of last year. Last fall's TARP bill extended this benefit through the end of 2012*. So it's important to note that the West Texas project would have collected a similar amount of money from the government in the form of tax credits over the next decade, even without the option provided by the stimulus bill to convert those credits into an up-front cash grant. The latter merely made the cost of providing this benefit much more transparent. As noted in a report by the Investigative Reporting Workshop at American University, well over 80% of these grants to date have gone to non-US firms.

I can appreciate the outrage this has caused, particularly when this program was so heavily hyped as a way to create new jobs in the US during a recession, and in an industry that many see as holding the key to future US competitiveness in a carbon-constrained world. However, that outrage ought to be tempered by a clear understanding of the principal purpose for establishing the grants. Prior to the failure of Lehman Bros. last year and the subsequent seizing-up of the so-called "tax equity" market, it was customary for project developers to enter into agreements with banks and other parties to exchange the rights to their future PTC benefit stream for up-front cash to invest in the projects generating these credits. When that market became illiquid, new wind project development came to a virtual standstill. With financial markets in turmoil at the beginning of 2009, the Treasury grant program was conceived as a way to jump-start renewable energy project development, until the tax-equity market revived. In that regard it has been fairly successful, as evidenced not least by the sums issued under this program so far.

I can't tell whether the architects of this program failed to work through the consequences of their efforts sufficiently to see that, with domestic turbine makers such as GE Energy accounting for less than half of the US market, a large portion of the grants would end up benefiting foreign manufacturers. Perhaps they saw that potential but didn't appreciate the firestorm of controversy it would create, when someone figured out where the money was actually going. Or perhaps at that moment they were merely hyper-focused on getting legislation passed in order to arrest the apparent free-fall of the US economy. I'll leave that to others to sort out.

There's a deeper issue here, as well. The whole episode evokes memories of the endless debates over "industrial policy" in the 1980s. The US wind industry lags its European competition in market share because European countries chose to subsidize the sector through much more generous and consistent tax benefits and a hidden tax on electricity consumers (a.k.a. the "feed-in tariff".) But while that created an advantage for the European companies involved, it didn't make them self-sustaining or overcome the inherent shortcomings of wind power's intermittent output. In that light it's hard for me to regret that the US didn't invest more money in wind over the last 20 years. Another way to look at this is that European taxpayers and consumers have borne much of the pain of driving down the costs of wind power to a point at which it can begin to compete with power generated from natural gas (and to a much lesser extent from coal) with only the modest subsidies US taxpayers have been willing to provide.

That gets to the essence of the choice we need to clarify if we are to judge fairly outcomes such as the one presented in the proposed West Texas wind farm. Are we investing in these projects and these technologies mainly to create jobs in the US, or are we investing in them to generate low-emission electricity at the cheapest cost possible, in order to run the 90+% of the economy that is not devoted to producing energy?

Selling green energy as a jobs initiative has led directly to the confusion and consternation apparent in the reaction to Chinese investors and Chinese wind turbines in this West Texas wind project. The wind industry has already developed a globalized supply chain, similar to many other industries, and no one should be stunned if wind turbines from China show up in Texas, any more than China should be surprised that its nuclear power plant construction projects are creating jobs in the US. Our assessment of the value of renewable energy sources such as wind power should hinge on their efficacy at providing reliable and cost-effective energy supplies and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, not on domestic jobs creation--even in a recession.

*Correction: A reader reminded me that the TARP bill only extended the wind PTC by one year; the longer extension occurred in the stimulus.

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Gasoline Stimulus Update

Although it doesn't appear among the statistics that economists and market participants routinely track to assess our recovery from what some have been calling the Great Recession, a quick check on the status of the "gasoline stimulus" I described in June seems in order. Year-to-date, the retail price of regular gasoline has averaged $1.31/gallon below its price in the same week of 2008, leaving the typical American household with roughly an extra $110 per month of disposable income to spend on other goods and services, compared with last year. However, barring another dramatic collapse of crude oil prices from their present level of just under $70/barrel, that benefit should disappear within the next few weeks. Last October gas prices fell by more than a buck a gallon and began November 2008 below their current level. Once these lines cross over, any stimulus benefit from cheaper gas will be erased, with uncertain consequences in an economy in which unemployment is still rising.

The fact that average US gas prices topped out at only $2.69/gal. this year, far below last year's peak of $4.11/gal., was mainly a reflection of the weakness of the global economy. US gasoline demand through July was running at around 1% below the same period a year earlier, on top of 2008's roughly 3% drop. Together with very weak diesel demand, that also contributed to much lower refining margins this year, compared to the last couple years. However, even if refining margins averaged zero for the rest of this year, it would take a crude oil price drop on the order of $15/bbl to send gasoline prices below $2/gal., where they were last Thanksgiving. And we'd probably have to see oil down around $40/bbl to end the year close to the $1.61/gal. reported last December 29.

As I noted early in the year, although this gasoline stimulus was helpful while the federal stimulus effort was gearing up, it was always going to be short-lived. And just like the fiscal stimulus, we'll never know how many jobs it saved or helped create, though it's clear that we'd have been much worse off had this year's gas prices reprised their 2008 levels.

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Clunkers 1, Critics 0

I have to admit to being somewhat bemused at the apparent success of the "Cash for Clunkers" scheme, which burned through its initial $1 billion of funding so rapidly that Congress is still scrambling to find more money for it before leaving town. Although the final version of the program wasn't quite along the lines of the idea I supported back in January, it appears to have produced much more useful results than most critics predicted when it looked as if it would mainly move Americans out of old SUVs and into new but minimally-thriftier ones. Given its popularity and the boost it's provided the flagging car industry at just the right time, I very much hope the Senate will pass an extension before escaping the August heat and humidity here.

Let me briefly focus on a few key points concerning the program and its funding. If the report I saw in Bloomberg is correct in showing an average fuel economy improvement from 15.8 mpg for the clunkers that were junked to 25.4 mpg for the new cars that are replacing them, that works out to an impressive annual fuel savings of around 280 gallons for the average driver. That's more than the average Prius driver uses in total. Aggregate that across approximately a quarter-million new cars and it works out to 70 million gallons per year--impressive-sounding but still a relative drop in the bucket in a fuel market of 138 billion gallons per year. The corresponding CO2 reduction would be around 700,000 tons per year, which if you figure the cars removed from the road by this program likely only had a few more years of high-intensity usage left in them yields a CO2 abatement cost in the region of $475/ton. As climate policy, this wins no prizes.

However, despite the immense seriousness of that issue, climate surely can't be the only lens through which to view a program such as this. In particular, when you examine the way the House of Representatives came up with the $2 billion to stretch it through the end of September, it is clear that they viewed it as an extension to--or more properly an acceleration of--the federal economic stimulus. Their bill, which is a model of brevity and simplicity, shifted $2 billion from a $6 billion appropriation for DOE loan guarantees to advanced energy projects. Considering that the DOE still has yet to dole out all the money originally appropriated for this purpose when it was funded under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and that their highest-profile decision so far was to turn down an application from a major nuclear fuel processing project in Ohio, it seems fair to say that Cash for Clunkers will get this money into the economy vastly quicker than under a stimulus program that has taken its own sweet time about stimulating anything.

As New York Times columnist David Brooks described Cash for Clunkers in last Friday's weekly segment with Mark Shields on the News Hour, "It's costing some billions of dollars, but it's actually temporary, timely and targeted, so I'm all for it." Despite the program's reported administrative glitches, Mr. Shields liked it, too. That may be as close to a bi-partisan consensus as we are likely to get all summer.

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The Gasoline Stimulus

US gasoline prices have attracted a fair amount of attention recently, as they climbed from a national average of just over $2.00 per gallon in mid-April to $2.69 last week. Much of that increase came just before Memorial Day, which historically signals the start of the driving season and higher consumption. Some regions have even begun to see prices at $3.00 or higher. As the news media has reported on this trend, I've heard more than one reporter comment that the recent price hikes have erased the effective economic stimulus that lower gasoline prices provided earlier this year. That didn't sound quite right, considering how much higher prices were last summer, but it wasn't until I looked at the actual data that I realized the stimulus has actually grown in the last month or so, not shrunk. However, unless oil prices are headed for an even bigger collapse than they experienced last fall, this stimulus must be short-lived. It will probably end entirely by November.

The aspect of economic stimulus I'm considering here results from the year-on-year comparison of average US gasoline prices. As the graph below shows, since slumping oil prices drove the pump price of gasoline below its level of a year earlier, starting last October, US unleaded regular has averaged $1.25/gal. cheaper than in the same week a year earlier. Even with gasoline demand down by around 3%, that equated to an injection of roughly $170 billion after-tax dollars per year into consumers' pockets. Despite the recent increase in prices at the pump, that year-on-year gap has grown, averaging $1.41/gal. since Memorial Day. For the average household, which owns two-plus cars and drives nearly 25,000 miles per year, that has reduced monthly expense budgets by around $120, compared to 2008. This has surely come in handy, as unemployment grew and we all waited for the federal government's $787 billion stimulus to ramp up.

Unfortunately, by the same definition I've used above this gasoline stimulus has a time limit, because it is essentially a mirror image of last year's pricing trends. The effect is widening just now, as we approach the anniversary of the all-time peak of oil prices of $145 per barrel on July 14, and the all-time high US gasoline price of $4.11/gal. that accompanied it. However, once we pass that point the normal seasonal weakening of the gasoline market would be hard-pressed to echo the slide that took oil prices all the way down to a more than four-year low under $34 by year-end 2008. While gas prices should retreat closer to $2/gal. again by fall, they're unlikely to go lower, ending the 2009 vs. 2008 pump-price gap.

As the economy recovers, we should expect prices to trend back up, independent of the eventual increase we can expect from the climate bill the House of Representatives passed last Friday--assuming the Senate ultimately passes a bill similar enough to the House version of cap & trade to be reconciled and become law. That means that future fuel prices are likelier to be a drag on the economy than a boost. Anyone putting off a road trip this summer due to "high gas prices" should perform a quick reality check on whether they are ever again likely to be much lower at this time of year.

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The Other Stimulus

A short item on gasoline prices in today's Wall Street Journal had me scratching my head this morning. It suggested that the recent modest recovery of gasoline prices has essentially ended the economic stimulus that cheaper gas has provided to the economy. The article's author, Mark Gongloff, has covered energy for some time. He ran the Journal's "Energy Blog", before it morphed into the current "Environmental Capital" blog, and he did it well and with insight. However, in this case, he's off by a country mile, because the stimulative effect of gas prices doesn't depend on their continuing to drop, but rather on the comparison with prices last year. Moreover, when average pump prices bottomed out at $1.61 per gallon a few weeks ago, wholesale gasoline futures were cheaper than crude oil. That wasn't sustainable, and we're now seeing the correction. The real end of the cheap gas stimulus is probably at least a year or two off, when the resumption of economic growth sends demand higher, just as global oil supplies start shrinking due to the accumulation of unchecked decline rates.

Although at this week's national average for unleaded regular of $1.93 per gallon, gasoline is up by a quarter a gallon since the first week of January, it is still a buck cheaper than this time last year--when it was just beginning a run-up that peaked at $4.11 after the Fourth of July. That translates to a current year-on-year savings of $40 per month for the average motorist--about equal to the "Making Work Pay" tax credit that most Americans will receive as part of the stimulus package. And unless gas prices spike much higher in the weeks ahead, the scale of the savings vs. the prior year should keep growing throughout the first half of 2009. We all know this can't last, but it's been a nice bridge, while we waited for Congress and the new administration to decide how to take on the recession.

The reasons why the stimulus from cheap gas won't endure are starting to pile up. Although demand has fallen faster than OPEC can cut current output, resulting in a big accumulation of oil in storage tanks and oil tankers, OPEC has announced that it would delay 35 new oil projects. We've also seen a few major oil companies and many large independents cut their capital programs--some because the projects don't make economic sense at $40 per barrel, and others simply because their cash flow is down and they can't borrow easily in today's market. At the same time, the new US Secretary of the Interior has announced a six-month delay in plans to allow drilling in previously-banned areas of the Outer Continental Shelf. All of this will have a delayed effect on production, because of the time involved in planning and executing big oil projects. We might even see output grow for another year or two, thanks to the lagged effect of projects that were initiated when oil prices were on the way up. But fairly soon reduced drilling will be unable to hold back the steady depletion of existing reservoirs, and an underlying decline rate estimated at least 4.5% per year will assert control. At a current global production rate of 85 million barrels per day (MBD), that's nearly 4 MBD per year of new oil production that must come on every year, just to maintain present capacity, and it won't happen if drilling falls off a cliff.

Meanwhile, the benefits of cheap gas should last at least long enough for the economic effects of the stimulus bill to kick in. I'll take a closer look at those, once I get the text of the version that came out of the House/Senate conference committee and should be voted on in the next few days.

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An Ethanol Stimulus?

As the new Congress and incoming administration scramble to craft a stimulus package to lift the country out of the deepening recession, it's understandable that a variety of industries and their trade associations would be lobbying for their share of the expected federal assistance. Many struggling businesses no doubt feel at least as deserving of help as GM and Chrysler. With jobs at stake and pragmatism standing in for principle in this crisis, the Obama team and the Congressional leadership must make some tough calls in a very short span of time. One call that should not be difficult, however, is to rule out any further federal assistance for the struggling ethanol industry.

I'm late to the party commenting on a prospective ethanol bailout. Before New Year's, the Wall Street Journal and Business Week both reported that the Renewable Fuels Association and its members are seeking $1 billion in short-term loans and $50 billion "to develop ethanol technology and new biofuels," though I couldn't find anything on the RFA's website to confirm those figures. Backed by the lobbying muscle of Archer Daniels Midland, their chances of getting at least a portion of their request don't look half bad.

In order to see why a bailout ought to be unnecessary, let's remind ourselves of the federal assistance the industry already receives, summing the amounts for 2009 and 2010 to put them on a comparable basis to the stimulus:

• The largest item is the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit, also known as the blender's credit. The 2008 Farm Bill reduced this benefit from $0.51/gal. of ethanol to $0.45/gal, unless the quantity sold falls below 7.5 billion gallons per year, in which case it reverts to $0.51.
• The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) substantially increased the quantity of ethanol required to be blended into gasoline. Multiplying the minimum volumes for 2009 and 2010 by the blender's credit yields a combined $10.1 billion in assistance. While the ethanol producers don't receive this money directly, it supports the price of ethanol in the market and compounds the demand creation from EISA's Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS).
• Domestic ethanol producers are also protected from foreign competition by virtue of an ethanol tariff of 2.9% and import duty of $0.54/gal. The Farm Bill extended that benefit for another two years.
• As for assistance for advanced biofuels, EISA also authorized at least $595 million for R&D grants covering advanced biofuels, cellulosic biofuels, and biofuel-enabling infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Farm Bill provided a "producer's credit" of $1.01/gal. for advanced biofuel(i.e., not produced from corn starch.)

It's also relevant to consider why the ethanol industry is in trouble, just now. After being squeezed between spiking fuel and grain prices for the first two-thirds of the year, it faces a shrinking motor fuels market, in direct competition with a glut of wholesale gasoline that for weeks was selling for less than crude oil. But although these circumstances might appear at first glance to have been beyond the control of the industry, that's not entirely true. If ethanol producers had expanded at a slower pace over the last two years, instead of outracing the rising RFS mandate, there would be no ethanol surplus, their margins would be higher, and they would have less debt to service.

So that leaves us with an industry that will receive nearly $11 billion of federal assistance without a dime from the stimulus, and whose customers are required by law to buy most of their output. The excess capacity that is crushing its margins looks more like a manifestation of classic manufacturing boom-and-bust cyclicality than a result of the financial crisis, per se. If anything, the current slow-down might be an excellent time to prune the oldest, least efficient ethanol plants, to prepare the industry to compete with the next generation of biofuels from non-food sources, for which R&D is already well-funded by the government, venture capital, and the oil industry. That shakeout won't happen if producers are propped up with still more taxpayer money.

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Steel on the Ground

2009 is shaping up as the Year of the Stimulus. The consensus for a massive fiscal stimulus of the US economy, in the form of direct government spending and targeted tax breaks, grows daily. The biggest remaining questions focus on how much and how quickly. Estimates of the magnitude under consideration range from $400 billion to over a trillion, spread out over two years. Some would even like to see a stimulus bill ready for President Obama's signature on Inauguration Day. As urgent as the need to kick-start the economy appears, however, there are good reasons to spend at least as much time considering what to stimulate and how to go about it. That's particularly true of the energy economy, where the results of a stimulus will be felt for the next forty years.

An essay in Sunday's Washington Post highlighted some of the pitfalls of past government spending on infrastructure. Despite the best of intentions, our elected and appointed officials don't appear to have any keener insights into the future than corporate executives. It's inevitable that some of the stimulus will end up funding inefficient and ineffective projects, and in the interest of avoiding an economic implosion and a deflationary spiral of job cuts, demand reduction, price cuts, output reduction, and more job cuts, that might not be the worst outcome. But we need to ensure that the lion's share of the stimulus is focused on things that really need doing and that the private sector, even in the best of times, has difficulties undertaking. My top candidate for this is a major upgrade of our electricity infrastructure.

It's going to be very tempting for the federal government to invest directly in energy technology deployment--not just R&D--and even in private firms. The $350 million loan sought by Tesla Motors, the Silicon Valley electric car start-up that has just sold its 100th $100,000 electric sports car, comes to mind. We need clear guidelines that avoid putting tax dollars into companies that operate in markets that are already distorted by federal mandates and subsidies, such as those supporting biofuels production. But while I would not wish the government to invest in wind and solar power developers or their projects, the infrastructure necessary to make those projects more effective and competitive is a different story.

The case for increased federal investment in our power grids is similar to that for the Interstate Highway system in the 1950s, as another great enabler of economic transformation. Ever since the northeast blackout of 2003, we've known that the grid must become more resilient and reliable, and utilities and the grid operators have been working hard on that. But it also needs to be able to accommodate a much larger number of generators, ranging from rooftop solar arrays to widely dispersed utility-scale solar power installations and wind farms. Moreover, we need more long-distance transmission, particularly from the ten or so states that are home to roughly 80% of US wind power potential. Our best solar resources are similarly concentrated. If we're serious about reducing greenhouse gases from the electricity sector, which contributes a third of US emissions, this will require a better-integrated, higher-capacity, faster-reacting electrical grid to ensure that we make the most of distributed and intermittent renewable energy sources. It is also the sine qua non of the eventual mass electrification of our transportation systems, which account for another 28% of our GHGs and two-thirds of our petroleum consumption.

Unfortunately, we must also be realistic about how much can actually be accomplished, or in stimulus terms, spent on this task within the next two years. Although we might like to imagine a massive, Works Progress Administration-like marshaling of the nation's unemployed to undertake great tasks, those Depression-era efforts faced nothing like the modern regulatory requirements for permits and environmental impact reports. I've been associated with a fair number of large projects in my day, and the practical obstacles for quickly revamping the power grid boggle my mind. For starters, it would require setting aside all of the existing regional, state and local permitting processes and handing someone--a "grid czar"?--sweeping powers even greater than the power to designate "National Interest Electricity Corridors" that was given to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Even if permits were no problem and plans already in place, I wonder how much actual "steel on the ground" we'd see by the end of 2010, beyond "last-mile" investments, such as smart electricity meters. Perhaps the best we can hope for in this timeframe would be to fund the planning and design process and get all of the environmental impact studies done. That might stimulate a lot of engineering and consulting firms, but it wouldn't necessarily put many construction folks to work. I can't help wondering how many other aspects of a federal stimulus beyond energy will be subject to similar constraints.

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