Solyndra's Second Chapter

The details of the reorganization plan approved Monday by the judge hearing the Solyndra bankruptcy case reminded me of the admonition of one of my mentors always to beware of unintended consequences.  I'm sure the Department of Energy officials who recommended the federal loan guarantee for Solyndra in March of 2009 envisioned that the solar start-up would succeed.  As a worst-case outcome, they probably anticipated the loss of the entire $535 million direct federal loan ultimately provided by the Treasury. However, in a remarkable turn of events, the actual extent of the downside for taxpayers has now expanded to nearly $900 million, due to a quirk in the tax code and a subsequent DOE decision in 2011.

This odd sequence of events starts in early 2011 when two venture investors agreed to infuse another $75 million into the already failing Solyndra.  In order to facilitate this injection--presumably in hopes of protecting the government's substantial investment in the firm--the DOE agreed to allow the investors' loan to take precedence over the government's if Solyndra went bankrupt. Perhaps they thought that even in that case, they'd still recover most of the government's investment, because Solyndra had a sexy technology and a big new factory in Fremont, CA that could be sold to a competitor for close to full value.  They apparently didn't appreciate that Solyndra's high-cost technology had already been bypassed by falling polysilicon prices, and that the factory and its custom equipment wouldn't be of much interest to other solar producers, who were in the process of creating a huge global overhang of solar manufacturing capacity.  The Solyndra plant will now apparently be sold to a hard-drive maker for just $90 million.

In the meantime, Solyndra was piling up substantial losses running its plant and selling solar modules below cost, in order to compete with conventional solar panels that had become much cheaper. By the time Solyndra entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, its cumulative losses apparently totaled $975 million.  To put that in perspective, the combined after tax profits of First Solar, the largest US solar producer, for the three years in which the DOE's loan to Solyndra was outstanding, were $1,265 million.

What makes Solyndra's losses relevant is that, contrary to intuition, they didn't disappear in bankruptcy.  Instead, via the investors' plan for emerging from bankruptcy, they became an asset.  And because the DOE ceded the first place in line to private investors, it is those investors who will control those "net operating losses" retained by Solyndra's reorganized parent company, 360 Degree Solar Holdings, Inc. That company apparently kept none of Solyndra's hardware, but when it acquires other companies--in any line of business--it will be able to offset future federal tax liabilities estimated by Bloomberg at $341 million.  Meanwhile, the federal government is likely to recover just 5 cents on the dollar on its "secured loan."  The Solyndra loan is a gift that keeps on giving. 

Hindsight is 20/20, but it seems pretty clear that the folks at DOE were outsmarted by private investors who had a much clearer picture of the stakes for which they were negotiating.  As we were reminded last week, Solyndra wasn't the only investment they made that went bad.  Let's hope that the others don't include similarly unpleasant surprises.  Meanwhile, I wish the IRS and Alameda County the best of luck in appealing the bankruptcy judge's ruling.

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Does All-of-the-Above Energy Include Long Shots?

An article in Tuesday's Washington Post described the current funding woes of US research into nuclear fusion, focused on anticipated budget and job cuts at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, MIT and several other sites.  Aside from the general challenge of funding all of the Department of Energy's programs at a time of huge federal deficits and ballooning debt, it appears that domestic fusion research is being cut mainly to meet our commitments to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) being built in France.  The article goes on to suggest that fusion has been excluded from the list of "all-of-the-above" energy technologies that the administration has embraced.  That raises questions that would merit attention at any time but seem particularly relevant in an election year.

Before discussing its proper priority in US federal energy research and planning, it's important to recognize, as the article does, that fusion is very much a long-shot bet.  We know that nuclear fusion works, because it's the process that powers our sun and all the stars.  However, that doesn't guarantee that we can successfully harness it safely here on earth for our own purposes.  I've heard plenty of energy experts who think that the only fusion reactor we need is the one 93 million miles away, which remains the ultimate source of nearly all the BTUs and kilowatt-hours of energy we use, except for those from nuclear (fission) power plants and geothermal energy. 

Unfortunately, the challenges of harnessing the sun's energy bounty in real time, rather than via the geologically slow processes that produced fossil fuels or the faster but still ponderous growing cycles of biofuels, are distinctly non-trivial--hence the debate about whether and how to overcome the intermittency and cyclicality of wind and solar power through optimized dispersal, clever use of Smart Grid technology, or with energy storage that requires its own breakthroughs if it is to be an economical enabler of wind or solar. A working fusion reactor would provide an end-run around all those problems and fit neatly into our current centralized power grid, with what is expected to be negligible emissions or long-term waste.  Who wouldn't want that?

Of course fusion power isn't easy, either; it's the definition of difficult.  Scientists around the world have been chasing it for at least five decades.  I recall eagerly reading about its potential when I was in my early teens.  Then, it was seen to be 30-40 years from becoming commercial, and that's still a reasonable estimate, despite significant progress in the intervening decades.  I admit I don't follow fusion research nearly as closely as I used to, in all its permutations of  stellarators, tokamaks, laser bombardment chambers and other competing designs, all pursuing the elusive goal of "net energy"--getting more energy back than you must put into achieving the temperatures and pressures necessary to fuse the chosen hydrogen isotopes.

So where does a high-risk, high-reward investment like fusion fit into the concept of all-of-the-above energy that now dominates the energy debate on both sides of the political aisle, and in the trade-offs that must accompany any serious energy strategy or plan for the US?  After all, "all of the above" is an attempt to recognize the widely differing states of readiness of our various energy options, the time lags inherent in replacing one set of sources with another, and the need to continue to supply and consume fossil fuels during our (long) transition away from them.  While I've never seen an official list of what's in and what's out, my own sense of all of the above is that it's composed of technologies that are either commercial today or that have left the laboratory but still require improvement and scaling up to become commercial.  In contrast, fusion hasn't left the lab and it's not clear when or if it will, at least on a timescale that's meaningful either for energy security or climate change mitigation. No one can tell us when the first fusion power plant could be plugged into the grid, and every attempt at predicting that has slipped, badly. 

Fusion wasn't mentioned once in the Secretary of Energy's remarks to Congress concerning the fiscal 2013 Energy Department Budget, and it was only shown as a line item in his latest budget presentation.  Yet I can't think of any other new technology that's customarily included in all of the above that has even a fraction of fusion's potential for delivering clean energy in large, centralized increments comparable to today's coal or nuclear power plants.  We could spend all day arguing whether that's as desirable now (or in the future) as it was just a few years ago, but from my perspective it contributes to the option value of fusion.  No one would suggest fusion as a practical near-term alternative, but with the prospect of a shale-gas bridge for the next several decades, it might be an important part of what we could be bridging towards.

Overall, the DOE has budgeted just under $400 million for fusion R&D in fiscal 2013, out of a total budget request of $27 billion.  That's not insignificant, and devoting 1.5% of the federal energy budget to fusion might be about the right proportion for such a long-term endeavor that is decades from deployment, relative to funding for medium-term efforts like advanced fission reactors and near-term R&D on renewables and efficiency.  The problem is that DOE is cutting deeply into US fusion capabilities, not just at Princeton but also at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia, in order to boost US funding for ITER from $105 million to $150 million next year. Only the fusion budgets for Oak Ridge Laboratory, which is managing the US role in ITER, and for the D.C. HQ grew.

I'm certainly not against international cooperation in science, which has become increasingly important as the costs of "big science" projects expand.  However, even if ITER represented the very best chance to take fusion to the next level on its long path to deployment, the long-term implications of these cuts for US fusion science capabilities look significant.  As with the space program, once the highly trained and experienced fusion workforce and teams are laid off and broken up, it becomes enormously difficult to reconstitute them, if needed.  This is particularly true of those with advanced degrees in fields that have declined in popularity at US universities, or for which the majority of current graduates are non-US students who will return to their countries of origin in search of better opportunities.  I wouldn't support keeping these programs going just to provide guaranteed employment for physicists, but we had better be sure that we won't need them later.  I am skeptical that we can be sufficiently certain today of the likely deployment pathways for fusion to be able to make such an irreversible decision with confidence.

I understand that in times like these we must make tough choices; that's the essence of budgeting.  I'm also sympathetic to those who might think that fusion researchers have had ample time and support to deliver the goods, already.  Yet I can't help being struck by the contradiction of a DOE budget in which US R&D for such a long-term, high-potential technology is cut, at the same time that Secretary Chu and the President are pushing hard for multi-billion dollar commitments to extend the Production Tax Credit for renewable energy and reinstate the expired 1603 renewable energy cash grant program, a substantial portion of the past benefits from which went to non-US manufacturers and project developers. The total 2013 budget cuts for the US fusion labs are equivalent to the tax credits for a single 90 MW wind farm, which would contribute less than 0.01% of annual US power generation.  Although we clearly can't fund every R&D idea to the extent researchers might wish, I believe it is a mistake to funnel so much money--about 40% of which must be borrowed--into perpetual support for the deployment of relatively low-impact and essentially mature technologies like onshore wind, when the same dollars would go much farther on R&D.

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Politics and The Global Cleantech Shakeout

For all the enthusiastic comparisons of the cleantech sector to infotech or microelectronics that we've encountered in the last decade, one rarely employed analogy is turning out to be more apt than the rest: Cleantech seems just as capable as dot-coms and chip makers of undergoing an industry shakeout and consolidation at the same time it experiences growth rates that most other industries would envy.  US and European solar firms continue to fall by the wayside, and this week saw the sale by the world's leading wind turbine manufacturer, Vestas, of one of its Danish plants to a China-based competitor.  Because the cleantech industry has been driven mainly by policy rather than market forces, and has thus been deeply intertwined with politics, the global shakeout now underway will continue to have political repercussions.  Should Europe's monetary problems unleash a new financial crisis, then both the cleantech shakeout and its political fallout could expand.

The strained comparisons this week between the failures of Solyndra and Konarka, a much smaller solar panel maker, likely won't be the last example of this that we'll see this year.  Although I can understand the temptation to link these two situations, the contrast between an award-winning company that took more than eight years to go bankrupt in an economic and competitive environment vastly different than the one in which it was launched, and a business that was already doomed on the day that its half-billion dollar federal loan was inked should have dissuaded anyone from raising this issue.  The analogy looks even worse when you realize that Solyndra was only able to undertake the massive expansion that drove it into bankruptcy as a result of serious deficiencies in the DOE's due diligence process, which failed to spot the crashing price of polysilicon, the previous spike in which had underpinned Solyndra's business model.

Past shakeouts have left other industries in excellent shape, despite the pain they entailed.  Numerous US automakers went out of business during the Great Depression, which was also a period of great innovation that set up the survivors to become a pillar of the US economy for the next half-century.  It's premature to write the epitaph of US cleantech, which could yet emerge much stronger.  At the same time, have we ever experienced such a shakeout in an industry so dominated by government subsidies and industrial policy, against the backdrop of globalized competition with similarly supported industries in Europe and Asia?  The ultimate outcome looks highly uncertain.

In the long run, the administration's investments in cleantech will either look farsighted and courageous or tragically mistaken, rooted in a "green jobs" fallacy that emerged as an expedient Plan B after successive failures to legislate a price on CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions.  Of course this year's election won't take place with the benefit of history's verdict.  Its energy aspects are likely to be dominated by the behavior of oil and gasoline prices and a potential string of further high-profile cleantech bankruptcies, if the economy remains weak.  (The list of DOE loan guarantee recipients doesn't lack for candidates.) Is it due to defects in our system or merely human nature that such events seem destined to overshadow the positive energy visions that both sides will present to voters?

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More Lessons from Solyndra

I'll bet that those working and investing in renewable energy are even more tired of the steady stream of headlines from the unraveling Solyndra mess than the rest of us are. Today's crop includes more evidence of the political linkages to the overall process for determining the company's suitability for federal backing and the revelation that an investor in Solyndra was advising the US Navy to sign a contract with them, even as the firm was on the verge of collapse. None of this has done either the industry or the administration any good, and there is much to be learned from this episode. That includes lessons concerning direct government support for the full-scale deployment of renewable energy and other technologies.

Start with the ethics issues. No one should be surprised that investors in Solyndra were lobbying the DOE and White House in support of the company's application for a federal loan guarantee. That was hardly unique to Solyndra or renewable energy. And I'm perfectly willing to accept, unless proven otherwise, that both the DOE advisor whose wife works for a law firm representing Solyndra, and the venture capitalist who apparently advised the Navy to buy Solyndra's technology in his capacity with the Pentagon's Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative, thought they had done everything necessary to resolve any potential conflicts of interest in this matter. Yet in both cases it seems clear that even if nothing improper was done, the appearance of impropriety is very hard to dispel after what seemed like a routine transaction turns into a front-page scandal.

Whenever I see this sort of thing I can't help recalling the early training I received as a petroleum products trader for Texaco, which took anti-trust compliance very seriously. The lawyer who advised our Supply & Distribution department on such matters always reminded us to think about how our dealings with other companies might look if we had to explain them from the witness stand in a court of law. He invariably advised going beyond mere compliance; his mantra was, "Avoid the appearance of evil." That's a lesson that it seems many of the officials involved in the Solyndra debacle either forgot or never received, even if they believed they were in full compliance with existing ethics policies.

When you step back from such details it becomes apparent that these are precisely the sorts of conflicts that result, when the government involves itself so deeply in transactions of a magnitude that would normally be handled in the commercial sector--which even when it makes mistakes does so with shareholder dollars, rather than tax dollars. And make no mistake, if Solyndra had gone broke after receiving $500,000 from Uncle Sam, rather than $535 million, none of these other issues would matter or have seen the light of day.

It's perfectly appropriate--even necessary--for the government to make modest-sized bets on new technology in key areas, particularly when they require greater patience than most corporations are capable of. And it's to be expected that many or even most such bets will turn out to be dead ends, as Solyndra did. The problem is that while a few million dollars will buy a lot of renewable energy R&D, they will buy only a negligible amount of deployment. While the government can afford to make numerous small bets that don't turn out well but advance our knowledge in the process, it can only afford to make a small number of bets on the scale of the Solyndra loan. That ought to be especially true when the deficit and debt loom as large as they do, unless you're a firm believer in the "broken windows" theory of stimulus, or Lord Keynes's suggestion that the government could productively bury bottles of money and let people dig them up.

The easy question is whether the Department of Energy should have backed Solyndra. I have concluded the answer is no, and not just based on after-the-fact information. The much harder question is whether the US government should be in the business of providing this level of support for large-scale manufacturing or deployment, rather than just R&D. And even if it should, can it develop the necessary expertise and processes, not only to make such decisions at least as well as its commercial counterparts would, but also to insulate the decision-makers from the political influence that such high stakes are bound to attract. Answering that depends on a lot more than just one's political or economic philosophy.

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Hire the Best

The apparent selection of Steven Chu, the Director of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory to be the new Secretary of Energy looks like a good choice. Since he is already employed by the Department of Energy, he understands the organization he would lead. The lab he currently heads does important work on renewable energy and efficiency, which President-Elect Obama emphasized throughout his campaign. Bringing in a Nobel Prize winner in Physics to run DOE exemplifies the principle of hiring outstanding individuals with deep, relevant experience to manage complex problems. Let us hope that the outgoing and incoming administrations can agree on someone equally qualified to oversee the restructuring of the US auto industry, should Congress ultimately pass a version of the emergency assistance legislation on which the US Senate could not agree last night.

Dr. Chu, who is also a professor at UC Berkeley and the former chair of the Physics Department at Cal's cross-bay rival, Stanford, seems well-qualified to manage an organization that must balance the application of chemistry, physics and biology to a wide variety of existing and emerging energy sources with the legacy of the Big Physics project of a previous generation: the nation's aging nuclear weapons complex. A quick review of the Lawrence Berkeley website turned up some fascinating work, including the Helios Project, which aims to produce new carbon-neutral fuels through accelerated artificial photosynthesis. Although there were some other fine people in the running, and only time will tell how well this pick will turn out, Dr. Chu certainly brings an appropriate mix of technical knowledge and administrative experience to running this large and complex agency. Overseeing a federal bailout and restructuring of the "Big Three" US carmakers--an eventuality that looks less likely today than it did yesterday--would require an equally apt selection.

If a Detroit bailout does come to pass, one of the most critical decisions will be the choice of a federal trustee to guide the restructuring of the industry. Rumors that the former head of the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund was the front-runner have given way to a more familiar name, that of former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. His experience, including with the Chrysler bailout in the 1970s, certainly qualifies him for the post of federal "car czar." But as much as I admire him for his role in extinguishing the US price inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s, and for his handling of the investigation into the UN Iraq "Oil for Food" scandal, I wonder if an even more experienced car hand might be called for. The person I have in mind would be a long-shot, not least for being a Frenchman and a current competitor of the Big Three. Yet I can't think of anyone who better epitomizes the global auto industry with which Detroit has failed to keep pace than Carlos Ghosn, with his proven track record of turning around two car companies, Renault and Nissan, both of which he now heads. If we really want to make Detroit competitive again, I see no one better qualified to direct that initiative.

The drawbacks are obvious: cultural, political, and practical. All of those could be turned into advantages, particularly since Mr. Ghosn has become a keen advocate of electric cars, which would play well in the new DC atmosphere. In any case, I doubt that he would find the presumably-obligatory compensation limit of $1 a year an impediment, weighed against the historic challenge of restoring GM, Ford and Chrysler to global leadership, or at least global parity. I admit it's highly unlikely to happen, but perhaps we could just get him on loan, as a favor from President Sarkozy, with whom both President Bush and President-Elect Obama seem to have an excellent relationship.

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The Contango Warning

President-Elect Obama is expected to name his energy and environmental team shortly. Whoever is nominated as the next Secretary of Energy will be swamped with an array of competing priorities, including modernizing the nation's electrical grid, managing the nuclear weapons infrastructure, and above all guiding the shift to a greener energy diet that will reduce our greenhouse gas emissions, and perhaps also our dependence on imported energy. With regard to the latter outcome, however, the incoming Secretary should pay careful heed to the signal that the oil market is sending about the importance of boosting declining US petroleum production. While the media focuses on a front-month futures contract price for West Texas Intermediate crude oil in the low $40s per barrel, traders have been paying north of $60 per barrel for delivery in 2010 and $80 for oil in 2016. That suggests that the relief we are seeing at the pump today is only temporary, while the global economy is gripped by a recession and credit crunch. Our oil worries will return soon enough, once the economy recovers.

Aside from the remarkably rapid drop in the price of crude oil for prompt delivery, the current market conditions are unusual because of the steep rise, or "contango", of the prices in successive futures contract months. At yesterday's settlement on the New York Mercantile Exchange, oil for delivery in February carried a $2.59/bbl premium over January, and March was another $2.20/bbl higher. Oil for delivery in December 2009 was a whopping $13.81/bbl higher than the January '09 futures. The fact that sufficient oil is not being bought today and put into storage for future delivery to close the arbitrage opportunity this situation creates is a clear indication of just how tight commercial credit has become, recently. As it is, US oil inventories have climbed by 26 million barrels since the end of September, rising from close to the bottom of their seasonally-adjusted range to near the top.

Although the oil market isn't any more prescient about future oil prices than the stock market is about future corporate earnings, it still reflects the current consensus on the future--and not just of those with an opinion, like me, but of those willing to bet serious money on it. In that light, the extreme contango of the current market reflects many factors, chief among them the extraordinary weakness of current demand that has caused prompt prices to collapse, combined with the seemingly-inevitable collision between limited global supplies and the long-term demand from the large developing economies of Asia. Even if US oil demand never returns to its high-water mark of 20.8 million barrels per day in 2005--a level 6% above our monthly average for 2008, to date--the potential demand from China and India is more than sufficient to drive prices back to OPEC's desired floor price of $75 or more. Throw in a bit of political risk from our old friends Iran, Venezuela and Russia, and it's the current price that looks like the outlier, not today's long-dated futures prices between $60-$80/bbl.

That certainly supports the case for the next Secretary of Energy to push hard for the fuel-saving technology and alternative fuels that can reduce our dependence on expensive sources of foreign oil, but it might be less clear why maintaining domestic oil production and increasing it to the maximum extent possible matters just as much. We can't escape the mathematical certainty that imports must cover the difference between demand and domestic production. Those domestic supplies, which still represent 13 times as much gross energy content as our current 10 billion gallons per year of ethanol production, and contribute more than 30 times as much net energy to our economy, remain essential. Even a modest further drop in US oil production could negate the energy security gains from efficiency and additional biofuels.

There's also a lot of money at stake for the country, not just for oil companies. A new study from ICF International, commissioned by the American Petroleum Institute, confirmed the findings of the 2007 National Petroleum Council study in which I participated, to the effect that allowing drilling on the off-limits portions of the Outer Continental Shelf, onshore federal lands, and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge could increase US oil production by 2 million barrels per day in 2030, above the expected baseline. That would displace tens of billions of dollars per year of imported oil--even at today's low prices--while cumulatively generating hundreds of billions in state and federal royalties and corporate income tax revenue that would be very helpful in covering the enormous debts being run up combating the financial crisis and recession.

As I noted frequently during the summer's debate over offshore drilling, there's no question of drilling our way to energy independence. We urgently need to expand and diversify our energy supplies and become much more efficient in how we use energy, but that doesn't mean we can turn our backs on oil, just yet. The new Energy Secretary will have to work hard to ensure that the oil replaced by the aggressive adoption of renewable energy and efficiency technology doesn't end up being our own.

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