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Tampilkan postingan dengan label sanctions. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label sanctions. Tampilkan semua postingan

Selasa, 31 Mei 2011

The Cost of A Tougher Iranian Oil Boycott

Today's Wall St. Journal (subscription required) includes an op-ed calling for a stricter US boycott of Iran than the current one that prohibits importing Iranian oil. The proposal from Reuel Marc Gerecht and Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies would go a step farther, barring the importation of petroleum products that contain any components processed from Iranian crude elsewhere. Before any fuels or petrochemical products could be brought to the US, exporters "would have to certify that no Iranian oil was involved in its manufacture." Yet while the authors have clearly thought about how to maximize the impact of such a rule on the government of Iran, I'm not sure they've examined the potential impact on the US carefully enough. If their arguments about how European refiners would react to such a boycott are correct, then U.S. gasoline prices would likely rise as a result of these restrictions.

The logic of the proposal is grounded in fact. The US imports significant quantities of gasoline from Europe, though lately most of it is in the form of gasoline blending components, rather than finished gasoline that is ready to be put into a pipeline or sold over a refinery's or blending facility's truck rack. Last year total US gasoline imports averaged almost 900,000 barrels per day, with 39% coming from EU countries led by the UK, Netherlands, Spain and France. It's also true that many European refineries process some Iranian crude. In 2010, the EU imported 471,000 bbl/day of crude oil from Iran, comprising just over 4% of total EU oil imports of 11.1 million barrels per day. (Compare that to US oil imports in 2010 of 9.2 million bbl/day.) This amounts to roughly a fifth of total Iranian crude oil exports. At least on the surface, it looks like it shouldn't be too hard for European refiners to forgo this small input, in order to be able to continue exporting gasoline and other oil-derived products to the USA.

In practice, I think it would be more difficult for European refiners to make that adjustment than the authors imagine. For starters, those refineries capable of exporting gasoline to the US must generally be located near ports, rather than inland, and likely run more Iranian crude than the EU average, since this oil is delivered by large tankers. Then there's the question of how much Iranian crude a refinery could run and still be able to certify its products to be Iran-free. If the standard were simply that you couldn't export a larger proportion of your products than the proportion of non-Iranian oil in your crude slate, that probably wouldn't change what any refiner is currently doing, since most of their output goes into the local market. Certifying that there were no molecules of Iranian origin in any products destined for the US would essentially require running no Iranian crude at all, because of the way that most refineries operate and manage their inventories of crude oil and unfinished products.

I presume that's what the authors have in mind, because it would certainly exert the greatest market pressure on the price of Iranian crude. However, substituting one crude oil for another in a refinery isn't like substituting one brand of cola for another in a fast-food restaurant. We've seen a prime example of that recently with the disproportionately large disruption caused by the curtailment of exports of high-quality oil from Libya. Refineries tend to be optimized around certain proportions of well-known crudes, with shifts in those proportions mainly driven by changes in the value of the products they yield, within a range set by the capabilities of the specific hardware. In other words, if your refinery model is telling you to run x% of Iranian Light, then choosing something else in order to be able to sell into the US market comes at a cost.

That cost would be passed on to companies importing European gasoline into the US in two ways. First, it would require a higher price to make it worthwhile for the exporting refinery to produce a cargo to US specifications. Less directly but just as significantly, it would reduce the number of refineries competing for the export opportunity, because some would simply find the changes too onerous, unless the premium they collected was really large. That would create a smaller pool of suppliers with higher costs. That's not what you want to face as a buyer.

Market dynamics might also amplify this effect. A portion of the gasoline exported from Europe to the US flows not under long-term contracts, but as "spot" cargoes shipped in response to occasional wide price differences between there and here. That's exactly the kind of trading I was involved in when I worked in London in the early '90s. Such "arbitrage opportunities" often result from supply problems such as refinery accidents and other unanticipated shutdowns, large weather events, or other situations leading to a local or regional price spike. As a result, much of the impact on the US from the authors' proposal could be delivered when gas prices here would already be rising, thus adding to the economic impact of a price spike.

Perhaps paying more at the pump to drive down the value of Iranian crude in the global market is a price most Americans would be willing to accept. I'd gladly kick in a few cents per gallon for that purpose, since I remain extremely skeptical of Iranian assurances that their nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes. Nothing has materially changed my view of that since my detailed analysis in 2005. However, I suspect that the strong likelihood that such a boycott would entail a certain amount of "blowback" at home would complicate the politics of passing the necessary legislation, particularly when gas prices are already quite high by US standards.

Rabu, 09 Juni 2010

Iran and Oil Price Risk

Today's UN Security Council vote on a further round of sanctions on Iran merits attention. While the U.S. and its key allies were able to get a somewhat diluted slate of new sanctions passed, the vote may be as notable for the "nays" cast by Brazil and Turkey as for the "ayes" it received from Russia and China, along with Lebanon's abstention. It looks like Iran has astutely leveraged the fraying of traditional alignments following the global economic shake-up of the last two years. The significant recent deterioration of Israel's image and standing probably played a backstage role, as well. It's a toss-up whether this new configuration makes an eventual confrontation over Iran's nuclear program more or less inevitable than previously.

Tensions over Iran's nuclear program have been moderated somewhat by ongoing diplomatic initiatives that have fragmented into parallel conversations between Iran and the US plus its closest European allies, Iran and its neighbors, and Iran and various emerging and non-aligned countries. However, jaw-jaw aside, Iran is either moving inexorably towards a nuclear weapons and delivery capability or putting on a pretty convincing Potemkin show of this for its own inscrutable reasons, reminiscent of Saddam Hussein's WMD sham of a few years ago. Either way, this still looks like the biggest unresolved political risk hanging over global oil markets, even if they're presently too distracted by the turmoil in currency and stock markets and the wave of offshore oil exploration bans emanating from the Gulf Coast leak to pay much attention to the risk of conflict.

This dance has been going on for years, but important elements have changed recently in ways that might alter calculations of the risks of a military strike by Israel--or anyone else--on Iran's facilities, relative to the risks of allowing Iran to produce a warhead and match it to its increasingly sophisticated missile technology. Last week's fiasco involving Israel's interdiction of a convoy of ships carrying aid to Gaza looms large, for several reasons. First, it has further isolated Israel from traditionally sympathetic countries in Europe and elsewhere. That could be crucial in the aftermath of any Israeli moves against Iran. In addition, Israel's action alienated low-key regional ally Turkey, not least because the convoy sailed from Istanbul and most of the fatalities were Turks. When Iran, Turkey and Russia meet to discuss regional security, it's a pretty clear sign that things are changing in noteworthy ways. (The slow drift of Turkey out of the western orbit after years of being rebuffed for EU membership may go down as one of the biggest missed opportunities of the post-Cold War era.)

As another Washington Post article indicated this morning, the latest sanctions might bite a little harder but could leave Iran's leaders feeling they have come out ahead in this round. If so, they won't be deterred to any greater extent from pursuing their oft-denied but widely-assumed nuclear aims. Meanwhile Israel has even less scope than before to launch an Osirak-style attack without facing a crippling response from its friends. As I noted last fall, the window of opportunity for resolving this slow-burn crisis without risking intolerable consequences for oil prices will not remain open indefinitely.