Why Does Gazprom Oppose Shale Gas?

I see that Russia's national gas company, Gazprom, is warning Europeans about the environmental risks of shale gas development. Aside from the hypocrisy stemming from a Russian legacy of environmental disregard that rivals the worst excesses committed anywhere, along with the likelihood of Gazprom profiting if it can deter competition from proliferating shale drilling technologies like hydraulic fracturing (a.k.a "fracking") and horizontal drilling, this looks quite clever. Environmental concerns--exaggerated or not--are the Achilles heel of shale drilling. We've seen how how effective environmental opposition to fracking has been in places like New York state. The mere fact of Gazprom's warning about shale drilling doesn't constitute a winning argument either for or against the practice, but the reasons they would be moved to comment might shed further light on shale's potential, which they publicly dismiss as a temporary phenomenon.

If Russia's leaders have anything to fear from the development of shale gas in Europe, much of the blame rests with their own behavior. Gazprom alone has access to the largest conventional natural gas reserves on earth--more than the entire natural gas reserves of Iran--and it has built the pipelines necessary to make Russia the dominant gas supplier to Europe. The latest addition to that network, the Nordstream pipeline--a source of some controversy of its own a few years back--opened just last month. They are also almost certainly correct that European shale gas would be more expensive than Russian gas, at least initially, if you ignore its value in providing Europe with some much-needed leverage with a supplier that hasn't hesitated to play hardball in the past, to the point of cutting off gas shipments during contractual disputes--in winter.

Since Gazprom's credibility on the economic and commercial merits of shale gas development is effectively nil, it makes perfect sense that they would pick up on the environmental arguments that have slowed development elsewhere and in some cases brought it to a standstill. The effectiveness of these arguments is enhanced because they contain a grain of truth: Like all other industrial-scale activities, shale gas drilling is not risk-free. It is possible for a drilling contractor to fail to cement a well properly, creating a chance of contaminating nearby water wells, although some presumed instances of this turned out to have other causes. It's also possible for a driller to mishandle fracking fluid or produced water above ground and affect surface water supplies. Then there are the allegations that leaking methane from shale gas wells negates any emissions benefits and renders the gas at least as bad as coal for climate change--never mind that these claims have been comprehensively examined and disproved.

Although I expect debate on these points to continue for some time, I believe that ultimately shale gas drilling will proceed on a large scale in the US and globally, with some minor tweaks to a regulatory system that already does a pretty good job of monitoring the activity and weeding out those producers that aren't diligent enough about protecting the public and environment. I would also argue that this scenario must be exactly what Gazprom's management believes will happen in Europe, absent a lot more support for those who oppose shale gas for a variety of reasons, including its competition with the more expensive forms of renewable energy. That doesn't automatically make European opponents of shale drilling convenient tools for the resource nationalism of an increasingly authoritarian neighbor, but it certainly ought to make them exercise great caution before entering into any "strange bedfellows" alliances with as self-interested a party as Russia's state energy complex.

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Do OPEC Meetings Matter?

Yesterday's meeting of OPEC in Vienna attracted extra attention because of disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Iran that extend well beyond the oil fields. The resulting impasse over increasing production to stem high oil prices and support a weakening global economy produced a much-quoted assessment from the Saudi Oil minister, Ali Naimi, who described it as "one of the worst meetings we ever had in OPEC." Yet while the events in the Middle East were at the forefront for most commentators, the outcome of the meeting seems understandable purely in the context of OPEC's own history and the current fundamentals of the market. I'm not sure why so many people appeared to expect OPEC to boost output in anticipation of demand that might not materialize.

I have followed OPEC meetings for nearly 30 years, though not always as closely as when I was trading oil and its products, the prices of which stood to rise or fall depending on what was decided in Vienna. My interest in this meeting went up significantly when I received a call inviting me to participate in a panel discussion about it on the Voice of Russia radio network yesterday afternoon. An hour or two of research revealed a global oil market that is currently well-supplied, with inventories in most developed countries running at fairly typical levels and inventories in the US actually on the high side of normal for this time of the year. That's pretty much the argument that OPEC's price hawks took into yesterday's session.

However, the Saudis and others arguing for higher quotas were looking ahead to the effects of summer demand, especially in rapidly growing Asia, and the buildup of inventories for the fall and winter heating fuel season. They--along with the IEA--anticipated demand growing faster than supply, particularly when the impact of the curtailments from Libya and Yemen are factored in. Such events are important because of the quality difference between the oil that's been shut in in those countries and the spare capacity elsewhere that's available to make up for it.

OPEC's main problem is that the outlook for the global economy has weakened in the last few weeks, and not just because oil has risen to above $115 per barrel, compared to its average of $80 or so last year. The stakes for them look even higher when you factor in a history that includes boosting production in the late 1990s to meet roaring demand in Asia-Pacific, only to see the Asian Economic Crisis slam demand growth in the region into reverse, sending crude prices tumbling from the $20s to single digits by the end of 1998. The doves within OPEC were focused on keeping prices below the level at which large chunks of demand were destroyed in 2008, while the hawks seemed willing to risk that outcome to avert a future price collapse and preserve the revenue they need to fund their national agendas.

The potential consequences for individual OPEC members are substantial. Consider Algeria, which exports about 1.8 million barrels per day. The difference between the current price and what they realized last year equates to more than $20 billion annually. That might sound small in the context of the current debate over trillion-dollar US deficits, but it's nearly 15% of Algeria's GDP. It's no wonder that smaller producers and others with limited capacity to increase output--and thus revenue--would drag their feet on agreeing to raise quotas for countries with spare capacity.

If it sounds like I'm rationalizing cartel behavior that would be illegal in the US, that's not my intent. It's clear to me that oil prices are significantly higher than they would be, because OPEC has chosen to produce around 2 million barrels per day less than it did in 2008. In part they've had to do that to accommodate higher non-OPEC production--think Brazil and Russia--along with rising biofuel production, without weakening prices. The consequences for US consumers are equally clear: Gasoline prices are still more than $1 per gallon higher than a year ago, and even ignoring the impact on diesel or jet fuel that translates into an additional drain of $100-150 billion per year that can't be spent on other goods and services that would contribute more to the recovery.

OPEC meetings do matter, because as long as OPEC possesses both spare production capacity and the discipline to withhold it from the market, it retains the power to control oil prices. If we want to understand the decision process of this group of countries that is always struggling to reconcile its own often-competing, but still broadly aligned self-interests, our assessment should focus on their issues more than ours, however much we are affected by the outcome. Yesterday we saw the price hawks stymie the efforts of those producers who are worried that if they squeeze consumers too hard, demand will fall back to the lows of 2009, costing them hundreds of billions of dollars per year in revenue. But if demand continues to grow, that was surely not the last word, and this debate must be revisited within a few months.

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The New Oil Cycle

As of yesterday's close on the New York Mercantile Exchange, the price of crude oil has fallen 50% from its July high-water mark. The membership of OPEC must be experiencing an uncomfortable sense of déjà vu, recalling a similar drop between August 1997 and December 1998, when West Texas Intermediate (WTI) bottomed out at $10.72 per barrel, and the OPEC average price fell into single digits. The cost of production is much higher today than in the 1990s, so $10 oil is hardly in prospect, but even an extended period below $50 per barrel would cause severe pain to the oil industry and to anyone investing in alternative energy that competes with oil. However, while a return to $140 oil probably lies on the other side of a global recession, other structural changes could shorten the down-cycle, or at least put a relatively high floor under it, once the customary market overshoot has passed.

Previous oil-price cycles hold some useful insights into the likely bottom of the current cycle, but important differences are also apparent. The 1997-98 collapse was caused by a conjunction of events with strong parallels to today's situation. A wave of new oil projects collided with a sudden drop in global demand triggered by the Asian Financial Crisis. Producers faced a choice between cutting output and bearing unsustainable losses on every barrel sold, but their obvious response was complicated by two serious problems. Operators of mature oil fields employing secondary and tertiary recovery methods knew that once shut in, production might not return to previous levels, later. My former employer, Texaco, saw that happen at its century-old Kern River Field in California. Meanwhile, OPEC's members worried about a long-term loss of market share, similar to what occurred when demand for OPEC's crude fell by 44% between 1979 and 1985, requiring two decades to recover. It took an unprecedented coordination of production cuts between OPEC and Mexico, Russia and Norway--countries that might have otherwise capitalized on OPEC's unilateral cuts--to stabilize the market and nudge prices back into the $20s by mid-1999.

What's different today? Well, for starters, OPEC already has a working relationship with Russia, and the latter's output has stalled, while Norway and Mexico are both in decline. Meanwhile, OPEC has expanded to include Angola, formerly an important source of non-OPEC production growth. If OPEC cuts now, it's hard to see who would step in to steal their market share. The cartel has also enjoyed a better-than-normal degree of cohesion recently--always easier when you are producing essentially flat-out. Key producers such as Venezuela and Iran have seen first-hand the benefits of cutting a little to boost revenue a lot, and their economies depend on prices remaining near $100 per barrel.

Another important change since the late 1990s is the dramatic growth of Canadian oil sands output. The current production of 1.3 million barrels per day now constitutes a large fraction of the world's high-cost marginal supply. More than half of it comes from mining operations that could be slowed or temporarily halted with minimal impact on future output or ultimate reserve recovery. In other words, a drop in crude oil prices below the variable cost of producing synthetic crude from oil sands could be at least partly self-correcting, and fairly quickly.

Biofuels might end up in a similar position. With corn prices back down to around $4 per bushel and ethanol selling for an average of $2.22 per gallon at racks on Wednesday, the "crush spread", or gross margin for producers is around $0.80/gal, similar to where it has been for much of the year. But although ethanol had for most of the year been priced well under Gulf Coast gasoline, the sudden collapse of gas prices has inverted that relationship. With wholesale gasoline--specifically the RBOB mix designed for blending with ethanol--trading on the NYMEX at under $1.70/gal, and the ethanol blenders' credit falling from $0.51/gal to $0.45/gal on January 1, the incentive for refiners to blend more ethanol into gasoline than legally mandated is evaporating.

How quickly these factors could establish a hard floor under oil prices is anyone's guess, and I wouldn't be surprised to see WTI go well below $70/bbl before it corrects. This year's highs might have been helped along by a froth of speculation, but they were also what was required to destroy enough demand to bring a commodity with a low price-elasticity of demand back into balance with supplies that were straining at their near-term limits. That interpretation is also consistent with the dramatic fall in prices accompanying the current collapse of demand. But we can't forget that even if demand in the US and EU continue to shrink, thanks to conservation, efficiency, and alternative energy, the potential demand in Asia remains sufficient to outstrip global oil production capacity, once strong global economic growth resumes. Consumers should enjoy the relief from sub-$3.00 per gallon while it lasts, but they should not assume it will persist beyond the recession.

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Climate Change and Unconventional Oil

While Americans are focused on the debate over expanded oil drilling, which might eventually add up to a million barrels per day of incremental oil production, a much larger expansion is underway north of the border, tapping Canada's oil sands reserves. Today's Financial Times (subscription required for full access) reports that environmentalists and socially-responsible investment funds are meeting today with Shell and BP, concerning the environmental and financial risks of the greenhouse gas emissions inherent in oil sands production. This has important implications for future oil supplies, particularly with oil prices falling to a level that might threaten further investment in oil sands, even without considering the cost of mitigating or offsetting the sector's CO2 emissions.

Worries about the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from oil sands operations are not new. Ten years ago my former company approached one of the large Canadian producers about employing Texaco's (now GE's) gasification technology to turn byproduct petroleum coke into gas to fuel the oil sands extraction process, incidentally creating an option for the CO2 to be sequestered in depleted oil and gas reservoirs. Neither the economics nor the consensus for action on climate change was sufficient to move ahead, at the time. But with Canada imposing stricter rules for industrial sources of CO2, and with a new global agreement on climate change in prospect at the end of 2009, that perspective may be shifting.

According to the FT, the groups in today's meeting in London are focused on the financial risks associated with emissions from oil sands--emissions that are several times larger than those from conventional oil production. Some are calling for a moratorium on new oil sands and oil shale projects. If oil were still over $120/bbl, that argument would carry little weight. Even if the most extreme estimate provided by Greenpeace were correct, suggesting that oil sands extraction emits 100kg more CO2 per barrel than conventional oil production, that would equate to under $4/bbl of extra cost, based on the price of 2012 emissions credits on the European Climate Exchange at current exchange rates.

Two factors render that figure more significant than it might appear. Falling oil prices are pushing new oil sands projects close to their breakeven point, according to Total, hampering the industry's ability to mitigate emissions. At the same time, the sheer magnitude of the oil sands expansion makes these emissions too large to ignore. The latest forecast from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers indicates that oil sands output should increase from 1.2 million barrels per day (MBD) last year to 2.8 MBD in 2015 and 3.5 MBD in 2020. Without making expensive changes in operations to reduce emissions and capture and store CO2, or buying emissions offsets, oil sands operations could increase Canada's current GHG emissions by as much as 10%. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, the Canadian government cannot just look the other way, while these emissions mount.

There are many areas in which the goal of improving energy security aligns with reducing GHG emissions, including improved efficiency and more use of renewable energy. But oil sands--and by extension oil shale--represents a clear conflict between our desire to reduce our dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the need to halt the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. And with oil nearing $90/bbl, a $4 increase in production costs to manage CO2 could stall new development and reduce future oil output by enough to tip the global supply and demand balance even further in favor of OPEC and Russia. Unless the next administration is willing to sit down with our NAFTA partners to discuss a comprehensive North American approach to both energy and emissions, this matter will ultimately be settled in Ottowa, where neither the US Congress nor President can offer more than friendly advice.

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