Exports Raise the Bar for US Strategic Petroleum Releases

I've seen a number of Tweets suggesting that the US will release oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) sometime in the next month or two, perhaps in tandem with other member countries of the International Energy Agency.  Although circumstances might provide several possible rationales for such a release, including the implementation of tougher sanctions on Iran's oil sector and the possibility that Hurricane Isaac will disrupt some production in the Gulf Coast, it's hard to avoid a political interpretation, as well.  As we head into a close Presidential election, gas prices are rising again, and that's never good for an incumbent.  Selling oil from the SPR is one of the few levers available that might affect short-term energy prices.  However, much has changed since the Clinton administration released 30 million barrels (via exchange) in the lead-up to the 2000 election.  In particular, the country's switch from net importer to net exporter of petroleum products implies that a release in response to events other than a physical disruption in oil supplies could result in some of the benefit of such a release being exported, as well.

When it comes to uses of the SPR, I'm a purist, probably because I can recall sitting in gas lines and participating involuntarily in the bizarre "odd-even" rationing-by-license-plate scheme introduced during the oil crisis following the Iranian Revolution.  The SPR was designed to provide a backstop for our vital energy supplies in a true physical emergency, not as a tool for price manipulation.  I've also suggested for some time that the SPR is overdue for a comprehensive reassessment of its structure.  Our energy situation has changed significantly since the mid-1970s, when the present SPR was established, and we are in the midst of the biggest changes in US energy supply and demand patterns in decades.  We ought to invest the time and money required to bring this institution into the 21st century.  Earlier this year, I also suggested an alternative mechanism for leveraging SPR inventories without depleting them. These are tasks for after the election, whoever wins.  For now, we have what we have, and we should think carefully about the implications of using it in situations less compelling than a war in the Persian Gulf or an unanticipated disruption in North American or global supplies.

One of the changes that must be taken into account is our recent shift in refined product exports, about which I've written previously.  US refineries are capitalizing on the expansion of domestic oil production in a period of weak US demand to continue to operate at high utilization rates and export the resulting surplus output to growing economies in Latin America and elsewhere.  This is generally a good thing, because it helps preserve capacity that might otherwise no longer be available when our own economy eventually resumes healthier growth. It also sustains employment we would sorely miss in a terrible job market.  Furthermore, we have benefited greatly in reliability and flexibility from participating on both sides of the global market in refined products. Still, although I view our petroleum product exports as generally positive--just as I do Boeing's exports of jetliners--I wouldn't advocate using petroleum stockpiles purchased with tax dollars to drive down oil prices to give these refiners an even bigger export advantage.  Yet because of its temporary nature, in contrast to new pipelines or new production, that's exactly where at least some of the benefit of SPR oil released in the absence of a serious supply crisis would go now. 

That doesn't mean I regard rising oil or gasoline prices as harmless to the economy. Consumers are facing the highest pump prices heading into Labor Day weekend since 2008, and that could have a ripple effect throughout the economy.  But even if one ignores the longstanding bi-partisan principle that the SPR is intended only as a crisis-management tool, its effectiveness at moderating oil-price volatility is limited.  Last year's coordinated SPR release, prompted by the Libyan revolution, had little persistent effect on either oil or gasoline prices. A release now is likely to be no more effective when US refineries are already running above 90% utilization and the current 4-week averages show 3.6% of US gasoline production and 23% of diesel output being exported. None of these statistics suggest refiners are experiencing difficulties in obtaining feedstocks, other than on price.  Putting SPR oil into such a market might boost refiners' margins for a while, but it's doubtful it would do much for the product prices that matter to consumers. 

There are sharp differences between President Obama and Governor Romney, not least on energy policy. We're sure to hear more about energy from both campaigns in the weeks ahead, and I plan to analyze their positions closer to election day.  However, one factor this election doesn't need is a release of oil from the SPR that appears to be aimed at dampening gasoline prices that often decline after Labor Day without intervention, rather than being justified by a tangible threat to US oil supplies, and that fails to take into account the added complexity of net product exports. That wouldn't serve the interests of voters, taxpayers or consumers, and it would come at the expense of a little bit of our collective energy security. 

Read More

The Unlevel Playing Field for Energy

An editorial in last weekend's Wall St. Journal led me to a recent analysis by the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) summarizing the costs of the federal government's various "subsidies" for energy from different sources.  This is both useful and timely, since discussions of specific subsidies such as the expiring wind production tax credit inevitably lead to questions about how incentives for renewable energy compare to those for oil, gas, nuclear, and other more traditional sources.  As the Journal noted, the EIA stopped short of comparing these incentives on the basis of the relative productivity of different energy sources, but even without that it's still apparent that the category of new renewable electricity--excluding hydropower--received 21% of the federal energy benefits for 2010, while accounting for less than 3% of domestic energy production that year, when oil and gas, which provided 49% of US energy production, received less than 8% of these benefits.  Whether on an absolute or relative basis, renewables receive much more generous federal support than oil and gas.

Before digging further into the EIA's analysis, I should point out an important distinction between the federal expenses and incentives covered in the report and the externalities that are frequently conflated with them.  It is certainly true that many of these energy technologies involve significant impacts that aren't reflected in their market prices, and that the production and especially the consumption of fossil fuels create serious environmental and security externalities. However, to whatever extent federal subsidies address externalities they do so indirectly, at best, and in many cases inefficiently.  The focus of this posting, just like the EIA report's, is on the federal government's cash outlays and "tax expenditures"--deductions, credits, etc.--that have a direct bearing on the federal deficit and debt burden that are the subject of intense debate in this election cycle.

The tables in the report's executive summary reveal several key facts.  Between 2007 and 2010 federal energy subsidies in constant dollars more than doubled to $37.2 B, with most of the increase going to renewables and energy efficiency, except for a sizable bump in low-income energy assistance payments.   $14.8 B of the increase originated with the 2009 stimulus bill, none of which was directed at oil and gas, but which appropriated nearly $8 B to conservation and efficiency.  Overall, renewables received $14.7 B, split 55/45 between electricity and biofuels, while nuclear received $2.5 B and oil and gas $2.8 B.  The latter figure is lower than you'll see elsewhere, because among other incentives that the EIA chose to exclude from its analysis was the Section 199 deduction for manufacturers, which is budgeted at around $1 B/yr for oil and gas firms.  The logic behind that exclusion seems sound, because US manufacturers of biofuels, wind turbines, solar panels and other renewable energy equipment qualify for the same tax credit, and at a higher rate than oil companies.

I was also struck by the fact that oil and gas received just $70 million out of the more than $4 B spent on R&D. If there's one category in which federal expenditures on renewables should be expected to dwarf those for conventional energy, this is it, and they did so by a factor of more than 20 times.  (Coal R&D received more than $0.6 B, presumably for clean coal technologies.)

It's also the case that while the growth of renewable energy output from 2000-10 was dramatic, the relatively smaller net changes in oil and gas output in that period masked the substantial replacement of depleting resources that would have otherwise resulted in a large drop in output, especially for natural gas.  This is precisely the aspect of the mature oil and gas industry at which these federal incentives are aimed, to enable US projects to compete with the international opportunities to which many of these companies have access.

The authors of the report suggested caution in comparing the allocations of incentives to the energy produced by each technology, because some of these incentives were paid for projects still under construction and in some cases represented the front-loading of what would otherwise have been a 10-year stream of tax credits.  Fair enough.  Yet even with the conservative assumption that the entire $4.9 B of non-R&D subsidies for wind power in 2010 came in the form of cash grants in lieu of the 30% investment tax credit for new wind turbines that would produce for 20 years at a 30% capacity factor, that still equates to a subsidy of more than 16% of the average present wholesale value of all the electricity those turbines will produce, using prevailing industrial sector electricity prices as a proxy for wholesale prices.  By comparison, the $2.7 B of oil and gas tax incentives for 2010 represented just 1% of the wholesale value of US production of these fuels, before refining.

A serious debate about the appropriate level of US energy subsidies should begin with the facts, rather than with misperceptions. It should also focus first on the goals of such incentives, before jumping to the details of this tax credit vs. that one.  What do we want these measures to achieve?  If it's simply the promotion of energy production, then the current incentive system looks too heavily skewed in favor of renewables.  If it's jobs, then we should be realistic about how many can be added by such a capital-intensive sector.  If it's the promotion of both energy security and innovation, then at least parts of the current system look directionally right, though I'd argue that we'd benefit from spending more on renewable energy R&D and less on the deployment of mature-but-expensive technologies like wind.  However, if emissions and climate change are our primary concerns, then these incentives are not a terribly effective way to address them.  My own expectation is that regardless of whether the wind tax credit is extended for another year, most of the tax incentives that the EIA assessed here will eventually be swept away by tax reform focused on reducing corporate tax rates to improve US competitiveness, while eliminating loopholes to make the changes revenue-neutral.

Read More

Are Films the Answer to Understanding Energy's Complexities?

The issues and choices surrounding our use of energy have rarely been more complex than today, yet our main channels for information about them are discouragingly shallow.  The web is often more effective at spreading misperceptions than fact-based analysis.  When our visual media focus on energy, it's usually to flash bad news before flitting on to the next story, leaving behind images of burning oil platforms or blacked-out cities.  One bright spot is the recent wave of documentary films on energy topics.  Films engage us on a deeper level, and the energy challenges we face deserve such longer-form treatment. August seems like a perfect time to suggest a few of them to you.  If you're reading this blog, then I'm betting you might at least consider watching a movie about energy instead of the latest summer blockbuster.   

Although it was hardly the first serious film about energy, the recent trend seemed to start with "Gasland". For all its inaccuracies, which have been documented by groups outside industry, that film helped start a national conversation about the right way to develop the enormous unconventional oil and gas resources that new combinations of technology have unlocked. In the spirit of making that dialog more constructive and even-handed, you should also know about two other documentaries covering the same topic and region from a different angle.  To many of the farmers and other landowners in depressed counties of New York and Pennsylvania, fracking is not a curse but an actual or potential lifeline. Seeing "Truthland" and "Empire State Divide" might not convert fracking skeptics into gas industry supporters, but it should at least fill in some of the gaps left by the "Gasland's" starkly one-sided portrayal of shale gas.

Another energy film I recently ran across, "spOILed", offers a timely reminder that despite oil's many problems it remains an essential ingredient of our global civilization, providing affordable mobility and a host of products that have made our lives much easier than those of our ancestors--or of people in countries that still lack reliable access to energy.  "spOILed" is also very much a movie about the dangers of Peak Oil, which envisions a world in which declining oil production, rising demand in developing countries, and geopolitical risks create persistent and growing shortages of oil.  This is particularly sobering when combined with a sense of just how challenging it will be to obtain the services that oil now provides from other energy sources.   Unfortunately, the film's message was undermined by occasionally jarring choices of visuals, some hyperbolic claims--no indoor plumbing without oil?--and by political overtones that might limit its effectiveness with the wider audience it appears to target. 

The energy film project that I'm most excited about is one aimed consciously at finding and cultivating "The Rational Middle" in the energy debate.  According to its director, Gregory Kallenberg, it started with a TED talk following his previous film, "Haynesville", which examined the impact of shale gas in Northern Louisiana.  As I understand it, the current project consists of 10 short videos on energy, four of which have been released on the group's website so far.  From the episodes I've seen, Mr. Kallenberg's team assembled an impressive group of experts, including Amy Myers Jaffe of the Baker Institute at Rice University, Michael Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Energy Information Agency Administrator Richard Newell, and Dr. Michael Webber of the University of Texas. The series is being launched with a road show featuring panels of some of the same experts interviewed in the films, starting with a session at this year's Aspen Ideas Festival.  The films are focused on information and process, rather than on selling one point of view. Aside from a few assertions in a couple of interviews, the factual presentation in the initial videos was very sound.  I expect to have more to say about The Rational Middle as additional episodes become available. 

If the we are to develop effective energy policies for the 21st century, the public's desire for clean, secure, reliable and affordable energy must be grounded in facts and figures that help us to differentiate realistic expectations from wish fulfilment.   I'm encouraged that a growing number of filmmakers seems willing to explore energy issues in the depth they deserve, with production values that will connect with today's audiences, rather than turning them off. Enjoy!

Read More

Last Hurrah for the Wind Power Tax Credit?

Ahead of Thursday's meeting of the Senate Finance Committee, a bipartisan deal has apparently omitted the expiring production tax credit (PTC) for wind power from a package of "tax extenders"--various expiring federal tax provisions, including the annual "patch" for the Alternative Minimum Tax.  This development might surprise some of the industry's supporters, but the politics of wind have changed since I last examined this issue in February.  A measure that once enjoyed solid bi-partisan support is now caught between two presidential campaigns that hold diametrically opposed views on its fate. 

A quick review of the PTC seems in order.  This tax credit, which covers a variety of technologies but with wind as the main beneficiary, dates back to 1992--interrupted by several past expirations but then revived in essentially its present form. That's significant, because during the same 20 years in which the PTC has been escalating annually with inflation--from 1.5 ¢ per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to the present level of 2.2 ¢/kWh--the cost of wind turbines and their output has fallen significantly. In the same period, US installed wind capacity grew from 1,680 MW to nearly 49,000 MW as of the first quarter of 2012.  So in effect, we're subsidizing today's relatively mature onshore wind technology by a larger proportion than we did when it was in its infancy. That makes no sense, especially in the current environment.

The US wind industry has received substantial government support in recent years.  When the long-standing tax credit against corporate profits proved to be much less beneficial during the financial crisis, the administration gave wind developers a better option within the stimulus: a 30% investment tax credit that could be claimed as up-front cash grants, instead of having to wait until power was generated and sold over the normal 10 year period of the PTC.  From 2009-11 the wind industry received a cumulative $7.7 B, in addition to ongoing tax credits on older projects, manufacturing tax credits for new wind turbine factories, and loan guarantees for selected wind farms.  And even with new turbine installations in 2012 running well below their record rate of 10,000 MW in 2009, the wind projects that qualify for the PTC this year could receive a total of $4.5 B over the next decade. 

Many people seem to want to equate the tax breaks that wind and other renewable energy technologies receive with the controversial tax benefits for the oil and gas industry, without realizing how unfavorable that comparison truly is for renewables.  Subsidies for technologies such as wind are much higher per unit of energy produced, consistent with their intended purpose of bridging the competitive gap vs. conventional energy.  Yet since the total output of new renewables is still relatively small, the disparity in total subsidies is much larger than it appears.  One way to illustrate that is that if the oil and natural gas produced in the US received tax credits at the same rate per equivalent kWh as wind power, then the annual oil and gas tax preferences that the Congress and President Obama have been sparring over for the last three years wouldn't be $4.8 B per year, but around $100 B per year. 

As the Reuters article makes clear, there will be other opportunities for the PTC to be reinserted in the extenders bill or other legislation.  However, by persistently arguing for extending the existing credit without modification, the wind industry and its supporters may be misreading the public's appetite for such generous subsidies in a period of protracted economic weakness, notwithstanding the recent Iowa poll.  Despite its rapid recent growth wind still contributes less than 4% of the nation's electricity and just 1% of our total energy consumption, and the green jobs angle is wearing thin. Last year's expiration of the ethanol blenders credit set a precedent for ending another large, generous subsidy before its beneficiaries agreed they were done with it. If congressional Republicans line up behind their party's standard bearer on this issue, the wind industry will have missed its opportunity for a graduated, multi-year phaseout of the PTC, instead of stepping off a cliff in 2013.

Read More

How Secure Are Green Jobs?

It's been an article of faith among advocates of "green jobs" from expanding renewable energy deployment that wind and solar installation jobs are secure because they can't be sent offshore, even as the manufacturing of wind turbines and solar equipment increasingly shifts to Asia.  A story in MIT's Technology Review casts doubts on that assumption, for reasons that have much to do with recent reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) cells, modules and panels.  Green jobs, which in any case shouldn't be viewed as the main selling point of renewable energy, turn out to be much like other jobs in facing competition from automation, as well as from globalization.

Why would it suddenly make sense to consider installing utility-scale solar panels using the robots highlighted in the article?  PV module costs have declined dramatically in the last two years.  As I've noted in other postings, this trend reflects the expected experience curve effects--such goods become cheaper as you produce more of them--but also the fierce competition resulting from enormous over-building of global PV manufacturing capacity as countries competed with each other to offer generous subsidies for this industry.  One consequence of these PV hardware price declines is to increase the share of "non-module" costs in the total installed cost of solar panels. Because the power produced by PV is still more expensive than conventional energy in most markets, that tends to shift the focus of innovation toward ways to reduce the costs of the mounting hardware, inverters, and labor used to put these arrays in place.

The article makes it clear that only certain parts of the solar installation trade are currently threatened by robotic installation.  Robots apparently aren't suited to rooftop and small ground installations, yet.  However, with politicians busily blurring the distinctions between outsourcing and offshoring, while neglecting the ongoing transformation of work by automation, computing and telecommunications, it's worth recalling that energy remains a capital-intensive commodity business.  Keeping costs down is crucial for both energy providers and their customers, and thus for the entire economy they energize.  When labor is involved in producing energy, its productivity must be very high, or it naturally becomes a target of innovation and process reengineering.  That needn't mean low wages, but it does imply fewer workers working smarter, with more automation.

The energy industry offers excellent opportunities in many sectors, especially those that are growing rapidly because of new technology or the removal of artificial constraints.  Yet we shouldn't fool ourselves that these jobs are any more protected or permanent than any others, especially in segments that aren't yet cost-competitive.

Read More

Food vs. Fuel and the Midwest Drought

It was bound to happen.  As long as US corn output continued to climb year after year, the federal mandate to blend steadily increasing quantities of ethanol into gasoline could be accommodated without creating a shortage of this staple grain.  Unfortunately, crops are subject to all sorts of uncertainties, including the severe drought conditions that the middle of the country is experiencing this year.  Estimates for this year's corn crop have been revised downward, and corn prices have already broken through $8 per bushel, up from less than $6 a month ago, with consequences for the livestock, processed food and ethanol industries, as well as for export markets.  As soaring feed grain prices begin to translate into higher grocery prices for meat, poultry, dairy and other goods, will consumers demand relief from the EPA, which has the authority to curtail ethanol volumes?  The current betting appears to be that the administration will stand fast on the mandate, but anything can happen in an election year. 

Ethanol now accounts for at least 10% of US gasoline blending, by volume.  To meet that demand, ethanol producers will require around 5 billion bushels of corn.  In recent years, the ethanol industry's expanding corn demand was met by a combination of increasing yields and planting more acres in corn.  However, corn yields per acre are dropping sharply this year, potentially pushing output below last year's 12.4 billion bushels, if conditions don't improve soon.  That's in contrast to earlier expectations that this year's corn crop would exceed last year's by 20% .  This isn't the first time that the food vs. fuel trade-off inherent in crop-based biofuels has become an issue, but it might be the first time when both the demand for corn for ethanol is so high and the need for that ethanol in the gasoline blending pool is arguably so low.  In this context, food vs. fuel quickly boils down to a debate over the tangible benefits of corn-based ethanol as a fuel.  There's growing evidence that those benefits have been oversold, despite industry claims.

Start with the widely touted study from Iowa State University indicating that ethanol saved consumers $1.09 per gallon at the gas pump in 2011 and $0.89/gal. in 2010.  I read both the original study and its updated version when they came out.  It seemed obvious to me that the authors' grasp of gasoline markets and oil refining were inadequate, but I lacked the time necessary to dig through their math to uncover the source of their exaggerated results.  Fortunately, a pair of researchers from MIT and my alma mater, U.C. Davis, have now done that work and concluded that the Iowa State paper's findings--and the claims based on them--depended on a "spurious correlation": the relationships they saw were coincidental.

In contrast to the Iowa State studies, the MIT/Davis paper is very readable, and I recommend it to you.  In addition to debunking the statistics, the authors point out the key flaws in their counterparts' logic.  Foremost among these is that in order to have a large influence on gasoline prices, ethanol would have to have had a large impact on crude oil prices, which are the largest determinant of gas prices, by far.  From 2005-11 US ethanol production expanded by 10 billion gallons per year, the energy equivalent of 350,000 barrels per day of oil, or 0.4% of 2011 global oil supply. I've argued many times that the oil market responds disproportionately to modest changes in supply and demand, but the idea that a few hundred thousand barrels per day could translate into the equivalent of $45/bbl exceeds the wildest dreams of any trader I ever met.  The MIT paper concludes with the authors summarizing the likely impact of ethanol on gasoline prices as "near zero and statistically insignificant."

However, if ethanol hasn't done much to hold down gas prices, could a drop in US ethanol production resulting from paring back the ethanol mandate to reduce the pressure on corn prices cause a big spike in gasoline prices?  That's where the analysis in a paper presented to members of Congress yesterday comes in.  Dr. Elam's report suggests that rather than displacing imported crude oil, the main effect of increasing US ethanol use in fuels has been to divert domestic gasoline production into exports, while US crude imports have fallen based on a combination of lower demand (from the recession) and improved product yields per barrel of crude oil refined.  Even if you are inclined to be skeptical of these findings because the study was supported by poultry interests, data from the US Energy Information Agency and elsewhere show that US refineries are not fully utilizing their capacity, are exporting significant volumes of gasoline, and have a wider array of domestic and imported crude oils at their disposal than they did just a few years ago. In short, we're in a far better position to forgo a few billion gallons of ethanol this year than we would have been in 2008, the last time food vs. fuel concerns spiked along with gas prices. 

Corn growers have experienced droughts before, and in the past the price of corn sorted out who needed it most.  However, the market can't prioritize fairly among the competing calls on a drought-diminished corn crop when the single largest segment of demand is locked in place by a federal mandate. This represents a massive distortion that only the government can rectify. I'm sympathetic to the ethanol industry's dilemma.  After all, the federal government virtually begged them to overbuild capacity, but it couldn't guarantee they would earn a profit, even when it was providing a $0.45/gal. subsidy for their customers, who are required by law to use their main product.  However, the economic and environmental benefits of ethanol are too modest to shield this industry while forcing all other corn users to absorb the likely shortfall in corn supply.  The most sensible remedy would be to unshackle ethanol demand, at least temporarily, and waive at least a portion of the ethanol mandate for 2012-13.

Read More

Should the US Become An Oil Exporter, Again?

Last week I missed attending a fascinating panel on the growth of US oil production, hosted by  the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. Fortunately, I was able to catch most of the live webcast, which is still available for replay. Much of the discussion focused on the potential of new "tight oil" production techniques, similar to those used to extract shale gas, to help usher in a new period of relative oil abundance.  If this comes to pass, among other things it could challenge long-established views about exporting US oil.  The politics of oil exports look absolutely dire at the moment, but the economic and logistical benefits--not just for oil companies but to the nation--are such that we shouldn't dismiss the possibility lightly.

Two hours was not enough time to do justice to all the ramifications of resurgent US oil production, and I know from following the Twitter feed for the event that some in the web audience were frustrated by the limited attention given to the climate implications of these developments.  However, if you'd like an overview of the possible economic and geopolitical impact of the US becoming more self-sufficient in petroleum for at least the next decade or two, this stellar panel was highly informative and worth your time.  Much of the discussion focused on tight oil, liquid hydrocarbons trapped in rocks that can't be economically tapped by conventional drilling, but that have proved susceptible to combinations of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing similar to those that have unleashed the current shale gas boom. Although the full potential of this resource hasn't been reflected in the latest forecasts from the Energy Information Agency (EIA) of the US Department of Energy, the results from the Bakken shale in the Dakotas and the Eagle Ford shale in Texas are instructive.  Together these two fields now produce around 750,000 barrels per day, or 12% of current US crude oil output, up from just a trickle a few years ago.  They also hold billions, and possibly tens of billions of barrels of recoverable resources.

I was a little surprised that the first panelist to mention the possibility of exporting some of this oil--with appropriate caveats--was Adam Sieminski, the newly confirmed EIA Administrator. After all, current US law restricts the export of most US crude oil production, with special exceptions for some oil from Alaska, California, and near the Canadian border.  In practice, crude exports from those fields have declined to very low levels.  Despite that, and even after significant reductions in imports since the onset of the recession, the US is still a major net oil importer.  If that's the case, and if US refineries can benefit from the increasing domestic output, why would we even consider exporting any of this new oil?

Unfortunately, the answer doesn't reduce to a neat soundbite; it depends on two key factors that require a bit of explanation.  The first issue is the quality of the oil coming out of these tight oil plays, which at least so far has been very high. Oil from different fields varies as much as fingerprints, even when we consider only a few characteristics of concern to refiners, and these differences strongly influence the market values of the various grades of oil.  Light crudes refine easily into valuable products like gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, while heavier crudes require more processing, using more expensive hardware, and often yield large quantities of low-value products like petroleum coke, even after intensive refining. There's also sulfur content--the sweet to sour spectrum that overlays the light/heavy distinctions--as well as other impurities.  Eagle Ford crude is light and sweet, as is the North Dakota Sweet crude produced from the Bakken. These crudes compare favorably with West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Brent and other premium crude streams.

The second, related factor involves the complexity of US oil refineries and the crude diet they've evolved to run. As production of high quality crudes in the continental US declined over the last four decades, many refiners invested billions of dollars to enable their facilities to run some of the heaviest, most sour crudes from around the world, because these were more readily available and usually significantly cheaper than the light sweet crudes.  This trend was particularly evident on the West Coast and Gulf Coast. The addition of complex processing hardware like hydrocrackers, delayed or fluid cokers, and residuum fluid catalytic crackers has given these refineries tremendous flexibility, but it also increased their operating costs and made it harder for them to go back to a diet of much lighter crudes.  As a result, while many of them could handle significant quantities of light crude from the tight oil fields, this would be less than optimal, resulting in economic penalties and perhaps eroding the advantages that have recently enabled gulf coast refiners to capitalize on export markets for their products. Those penalties would translate into discounts for the tight oil grades, compared to similar international crudes, much like the large gap in value we currently see for WTI compared to Brent, though for different reasons as discussed previously.

At current production levels, the mismatch of quality and capabilities isn't as big a problem as the lack of infrastructure for transporting these crudes to market.  That has resulted in discounts so large that it makes sense for private equity firm Carlyle to plan to ship large quantities of Bakken crude by rail from North Dakota to the Philadelphia refinery they've just acquired from Sunoco.  However, if tight oil output grows in line with forecasts such as those in a recent analysis from Citibank, domestic sweet crude refiners will have more than enough supply and the excess must either be sold to heavy crude refineries at a discount or left in the ground.  That's where exports come in. 

The last time exporting domestic crude became a big issue was in the late 1980s, when output from Alaska's North Slope (ANS) field reached peak levels of roughly 2 million barrels per day, far more than west coast refineries could absorb. I was trading crude on the West Coast at the time, and I observed first-hand the effects of the export restrictions that had been put in place when the Trans Alaska Pipeline was originally approved.  Those restrictions didn't just depress the price of ANS crude; they also depressed the price of the California crudes with which ANS competed, and made both types less attractive to produce. West coast consumers benefited from a few years of lower gasoline prices than they would have otherwise paid, but the net result was less industry investment and probably higher oil imports in the long run.  By the time ANS exports were finally approved in 1996, the field was already in decline and the biggest opportunity had been missed. 

The advantages of allowing a portion of these new tight-oil streams to be exported would derive from the difference between the global market premium for crude of this quality and the typical discount paid for the lower-quality crudes that gulf coast refiners would continue to import in order to optimize their product yields and costs.  A difference of just $5 per barrel across a million barrels per day of exports would translate into a nearly $2 billion per year improvement in the US trade balance.  The benefits might also include higher tax revenues and royalties if exports supported higher production.  The biggest drawback I see is that in the event of a global supply disruption, some domestic crude would be committed to non-US buyers, reducing our emergency cushion.  However, that problem might be circumvented by requiring exporters to include provisions in their contracts allowing them to suspend deliveries whenever the US government released oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, or a similar contingency.

Perhaps the best summary of the benefits that US oil exports could provide was given by President Clinton, when he authorized exports from the Alaskan North Slope: "Permitting this oil to move freely in international commerce will contribute to economic growth, reduce dependence on imported oil and create new jobs for American workers."  It's probably premature to provide a similar exemption for tight oil now, but it's certainly not too soon to start the national debate that should precede such a decision.

Read More